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The advent of constitutionally protected rights for 
students brought about a new role for elementary and 
secondary public school administrators. Representing the 
parent, the state and the Constitution of the United States 
requires that administrators have an understanding of the 
bases of authority and the limitations of authority for 
these sometimes conflicting roles. 
The three bases of authority for public school admin­
istration are: the parents, the state, and the Consti­
tution of the United States. 
The purpose of this study is to clarify and distin­
guish the changing bases of authority for student 
governance and discipline in elementary and secondary 
public school administration. This dissertation traces the 
history of the concept of in loco parentis from the 
Hammurabian period to the present, presents significant 
case law demonstrating the concept of in loco parentis in 
American education from 1833 to present, analyzes and 
interprets landmark Supreme Court decisions which estab­
lished constitutionally protected rights for juveniles and 
for students, and demonstrates the impact of these consti­
tutionally protected rights on the diminishing concept of 
in loco parentis in the administration of elementary and 
secondary public schools. The study identifies 
constitutional issues in the establishment of first, fourth 
and fourteenth amendment rights of students. Substantive 
and procedural due process issues are presented. 
The study concludes that 1) the establishment of 
constitutionally protected rights of students diminished in 
loco parentis authority in public elementary and secondary 
school administration; 2) the in loco parentis role of the 
educator changed; 3) the underlying bases of authority for 
elementary and secondary public school administration 
continue to be defined and redefined by the Courts; 4) 
Landmark cases define the extension of constitutionally 
protected rights to students; 5) public school administra­
tion in student governance and discipline changed with the 
implementation of due process procedures; 6) courts will 
intervene in matters of public school administration if an 
individual1s constitutionally protected right has allegedly 
been denied. 
The concept of in loco parentis continues as a basis 
of authority in public school administration but is 
diminished and redirected by the establishment of constitu­
tionally protected rights of students. Courts may 
intervene if an individual's constitutionally protected 
rights have allegedly been denied. 
Administrators should be aware of the alterable nature 
of the law so that they know the significance of the living 
constitution and can assume roles of leadership in the 
protection of constitutional rights of students. 
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A. Overview 
In the past twenty years, Supreme Court decisions have 
brought about a revolution in the administration of the 
public schools. School administrators had formerly 
answered to the parent and to the state. Representing some 
"average" parent meant that administrators actually repre­
sented the cultural mores of a particular community. The 
underlying basis of authority for governance and discipline 
was the concept of in loco parentis. Administrators were 
empowered to take great latitude in disciplining children. 
Societal changes brought a diversity of viewpoints 
before the public. Disputes between parents and teachers/ 
administrators became more frequent. It became increasing­
ly difficult for administrators to represent the view of 
some idealized parent. As disputes between administrators 
or school systems and parents entered the courts, it became 
2 
obvious that some clearer definition of the rights and 
responsibilities of students was necessary. 
The involvement of the Supreme Court in the arena of 
constitutionally protected rights of students extended the 
bases of authority for public school administration. 
Public school administration now has three bases of 
authority: the parent, the state and the Constitution of 
the United States. The administrator actually gets his 
authority from each base. But when one base of authority 
conflicts with another there is a hierarchy in the bases of 
authority. The courts may intervene if there is a viola­
tion of the constitutionally protected rights of students. 
The study investigates the concept of in loco parentis 
and its use as a basis of authority for public school 
administrators. The study presents significant case law 
which established constitutionally protected rights of 
students. The case law demonstrates the diminishing use of 
the concept of in loco parentis as a basis of authority for 
administrators in areas of student governance and disci­
pline. 
Conflict exists in the society between those who favor 
the expansion of civil rights for students and those who 
advocate a return to discipline based on the authority of 
the parent. The issues at stake in this controversy 
parallel those in the society at large. Administrators 
fall at varying places along the continuum between 
3 
expansion of rights for students and elimination of student 
rights. The administrator is sometimes caught in the 
conflict when parental or state authority conflict with the 
constitutional rights of students. 
If administrators are to function intelligently it is 
essential that they understand the bases of their authority. 
B. Statement of Problem 
Public school administrators must assume a variety of 
roles. These roles put the administrator in the position 
of representing the parent, the state and the Constitution 
of the United States. 
The phrase in loco parentis describes the position of 
school officials when acting in the place of parents. The 
phrase usually applies to the areas of student governance 
and discipline and student care and safety while the pupil 
is under the jurisdiction of the school. William Giessel-
mann summarizes the in loco parentis position of the school 
administrator: 
Under the in loco parentis doctrine, the school 
administrator assumes a measure of legal respon­
sibility for the care and safety of each student 
under his or her supervision. Actions con­
cerning student care and safety must conform to 
those which a reasonable and prudent person 
would have taken in the same circumstances. 
William Paul Giesselmann, In Loco Parentis And Its 
Application To The School Program; A Leaal Guide For 
Administrators (The University of Alabama, 1977), p. 233. 
A 
The duty of supervision owed to the pupil and the concomi­
tant right of school personnel to maintain discipline arise 
the in loco parentis concept. The duty of supervision in 
the educational process is the logical extension of the 
common law parental duty to protect. The standard of care 
owed by school personnel to a student are generally compar­
able to the parental standard of care. The law provides 
that people charged with care and custody give the same type 
of care as that which the individual is no longer able to 
receive. The courts have been steadily constructing a 
higher standard of care owed to students by school personnel 
by expanding the areas of negligence in which the educator 
2 may be held liable to the student. 
Current judicial interpretation considers the school 
administrator as an agent of state government. Giesselmann 
concludes that the following legal guidelines relate to the 
exercise of administrative authority concerning student 
governance and discipline. Subject to these guidelines, 
school officials have both a right and duty under in loco 
parentis to regulate and control student conduct within the 
school environment: 
(1) actions must be based upon maintenance within 
the school of a proper atmosphere for learning; 
2 Emma Jane Hirschberger, A Study Of The Development 
Of The In Loco Parentis Doctrine, Its Application And 
Emerging Trends (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of 
Pittsburg, 1971), pp. 249-250. 
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(2) rules, regulations, and all administrative 
procedures Concerning student governance and dis­
cipline must demonstrate recognition of student 
constitutional rights and related student respon 
sibilities; (3) substantive and procedural due 
process must be afforded all students in the school; 
and (4) curtailment of student rights must be 
based upon proof that specific exercises of such 
rights will materially interfere with or substan 
tially disrupt maintenance within the school of a 
proper atmosphere for learning. 
Administrators act as agents of the state with regard 
to a student's right to free speech (Tinker v. Pes Moines 
4 
Independent Community School District) and due process 
5 
(Goss v. Lopez). Administrators are also representatives 
of the state when they engage in searches of students and 
their possessions (New Jersey v. T.L.O.)The recent 
T.L.O. decision made it very clear that the in loco 
parentis doctrine did not justify infringement of Fourth 
Amendment rights, i.e. the prohibition of unreasonable 
search and seizure.^ 
3 
Giesselman, op. cit., pp. 232-233. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 
2d 725 (1975) . 
^New Jersey v. T.L.O., No. 83-712, U. S. January 15, 
1985 in 53 LW 4083. 
n 
George T. Rogister, Jr. and Ann L. Majestic, "New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.; The Supreme Court Applies The Fourth 
Amendment To Public Schools" (Raleigh, North Carolina: 
Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, January, 1985) , p. 3. 
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School administrators must safeguard the constitu­
tionally protected rights of students. While state legis­
latures possess plenary power in establishing and operating 
public schools, the power is restricted only by federal and 
state constitutional mandates. School personnel must keep 
in mind the scope of the states' authority to regulate 
educational activities. If courts have prohibited a given 
school practice under the Federal Constitution (e.g. racial 
discrimination), the state or its agents cannot enact laws 
or policies that conflict with the constitutional mandate 
unless justified by a compelling governmental interest. 
This means that states may not enact laws or policies that 
conflict with the United State Constitution. Any exception 
to this must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest, e.g. freedom of speech was a protected constitu­
tional right as long as there was no evidence of material 
and substantial disruption of the normal operation of the 
school.® 
Representing the parent, the state and the Constitu­
tion of the United States requires that administrators have 
an understanding of the bases and limitations of authority. 
The advent of constitutional protected rights for 
students brought a new dimension to public school 
O 
Martha M. McCarthy and Nelda H. Cambron, Public 
School Law; Teachers' and Students' Rights (Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, Inc., 1981), p. 318. 
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administration. Constitutionally protected rights of 
students limited the authority of public school adminis­
trators. When there is conflict between state or local 
regulations and constitutionally protected rights, the 
matter may be resolved in federal courts. 
C. Questions To Be Answered 
There is a need to clarify and distinguish the bases 
of authority for the multiple and sometimes conflicting 
roles that administrators assume in American public educa­
tion. 
In order to identify the legal authorities which are 
the bases for public school administration, there is a need 
to review the in loco parentis doctrine, significant case 
law regarding that doctrine, the Constitution of the United 
States, and the impact of recent case law on public school 
administration. 
The following questions will be addressed in order to 
determine the impact of constitutional rights of students 
on in loco parentis in the administration of elementary and 
secondary public education. 
1. Did the establishment of constitutionally 
protected rights for students by the judiciary 
diminish the authority of in loco parentis 
doctrine in the administration of public elemen­
tary and secondary schools? 
8 
2. What are the major judicial decisions which 
established constitutionally protected rights of 
students? 
3. What are the significant legal issues in balancing 
necessary school authority in carrying out the 
state's compelling interest in education with 
students' constitutional rights? 
4. What are the significant constitutional issues 
concerning the students' constitutionally pro­
tected rights versus the concept of in loco 
parentis? 
5. What are the significant legal issues concerning 
public school administrators and teachers acting 
in loco parentis, representing the interests of 
the state, and protecting the civil rights of the 
individual? 
D. Scope Of The Study 
This is a historical study of legal decisions which 
have influenced elementary and secondary public school 
administration student governance and discipline. 
These legal decisions place public school administra­
tors in three roles 
1. acting in loco parentis; 
2. representing the State; 
3. insuring constitutionally protected rights. 
9 
This study describes the extent to which each of these 
bases of authority is limited by the evolution oi case law. 
Discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine is limited 
to student governance and discipline in elementary and 
secondary public schools. 
Litigation which clarifies in loco parentis doctrine or 
defines constitutional protected rights of students is 
limited to decisions of State Supreme Courts, Federal 
District Courts, Federal Courts of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court prior to June 1, 1985. 
The assumptions of the researcher in this study 
include the following: 
1. This topic is an important one to research; 
2. Constitutional rights of students should be 
extended; 
3. Schools socialize students to accept existing 
norms and promote some change. 
This study is limited to literature relating to the in 
loco parentis doctrine published prior to June 1, 1985. 
E. Methods, Procedures, And Sources Of Information 
The basic research technique of this historical 
research study is to examine and analyze the available 
references concerning the concept of "in loco parentis" as 
it related to control of pupils and discipline in the 
public schools and the changes in law brought about by 
10 
provision of constitutional protected rights of students. 
In order to determine a need for such research, a 
search of Dissertation Abstracts was made for this topic. 
Journal articles related to the topic were located through 
such sources as Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 
Education Index, and the Index to Legal Periodicals. 
General research summaries were found in the 
Encyclopedia of Educational Research, various books on 
school law, and in a review of related literature obtained 
through a computer search from Education Resources Infor­
mation Center (ERIC). 
State Supreme Court, Federal District Court, Federal 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases related to the 
topic were located through use of Corpus Juris Secundum, 
American Jurisprudence, the National Reporter System, and 
the American Digest System. The Current Law Index and 
Index to Legal Periodicals helped identify significant 
court cases. Court cases were also found by examining case 
summaries contained in the 1983 -1985 issues of the NOLPE 
School Law Reporter. All of the cases were read and placed 
in categories corresponding to legal aspects of in loco 
parentis in public schools and and legal issues involving 
constitutional protected rights. 
F. Definition Of Terms 
Common law. 
As distinguished from the law created by the 
11 
enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises 
the body of those principles and rules of action, 
relating to the government and security of persons 
and property, which derive their authority solely 
from usages and customs of immemorial antiguity, or 
from the judgements and decrees of the courts 
recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages 
and customs; and, in this sense,« particularly the 
ancient unwritten law of England. 
Corporal Punishment. 
Physical punishment as distinguished from pecuniary 
punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or 
inflicted on the body. The term may or may -j^ot 
include imprisonment, according to the context. 
Discipline. 
Instruction, comprehending the communication of 
knowledge and training to observe and act in 
accordance with rules and orders. Correction, 
chastisementj1 punishment, penalty, rules, and 
regulations. 
Due process of law. 
Law in its regular course of administration through 
courts of justice. Due process of law in each 
particular case means such an exercise of the 
powers of the government as the settled maxims of 
law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards 
for the protection of individual rights as those 
maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which 
the one in question belongs. A course of legal 
proceedings according to those rules and principles 
which have been established in our systems of 
jurisprudence foij the enforcement and protection of 
private rights. 
9 
Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
(St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 
250-251. 
10Ibid., P- 306. 
•L1Ibid., P- 417. 
12Ibid., P. 44 9 
In loco parentis. 
In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; 
charged, factitiously, with, a parent's rights, 
duties and responsibilities. 
Liability. 
It has been referred to as of the most compre­
hensive significance, including almost every 
character of hazard responsibility, absolute, 
contingent, or likely. 
Negligence. 
The omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which 
ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the 
doing of somethina which a reasonable and prudent 
man would not do. 
Privilege. 
A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage 
enjoyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the 
common advantages of other citizens. An excep­
tional or extraordinary power or exemption. A 
right, power, franchise, or immunity held by a 
person or, class, against or beyond the course of 
the law. 
Procedural law. 
That which prescribes method of enforcing rights or 
obtaining redress for their invasion; machinery for 
carrying on procedural aspects of civil or criminal 
action; e.g. Rules of Civil, Criminal, and 
Appellate Procedur^ as adopted by the Federal and 
most state courts. 
13Ibid., P- 708 
14Ibid., P. 823 
15Ibid., P- 903. 
"^Ibid., P- 1077. 
17Ibid., P- 1083. 
Procedure. 
The mode of proceeding by which a legal right is 
enforced, as distinguished from the substantive law 
which gives or defines the right, and which, by 
means of the proceeding, the court is to adminis­
ter; the machinery, as distinguished from its 
product. That which regulates the formal steps in 
an action or other judicial proceeding; a form, 
manner, an(^i8 or<^er conducting suits or 
prosecutions. 
Right. 
As a noun, and taken in the abstract sense, means 
justice, ethical correctness, or consonance with 
the rules of law or the principles of morals. As a 
noun, and taken in a 'concrete' sense, a power, 
privilege, faculty, or demand, ̂ gjLnherent in one 
person and incident upon another. 
Search. 
An examination of a man's house or other buildings 
or premises, or of his person, or of his vehicle, 
aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery of 
contraband or illicit or stolen property, or some 
evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of 
a criminal action for some crime or offense with 
which he is charged. 
Seizure. 
The act of taking possession of property, e.g., for 
a violation of law or by virtue of an execution. 
Term implies a taking or removal of something from 
the possession, ac±iial or constructive, of another 
person or persons. 
18Ibid., p. 1083 
19Ibid., p. 1189. 
20Ibid., p. 1211. 
21Ibid., p. 1219. 
14 
Substantive. 
"An essential part or constituent or relating to what 
is essential. 
G. Significance of Study 
Public school administration requires the adminis­
trator to serve in various roles. The administrator at 
times represents the state; at other times the adminis­
trator represents the parents; still at other times the 
administrator may represent the constitutional protected 
rights of students. 
This study clarifies and distinguishes the bases of 
authority for student governance and discipline. Constitu­
tional interpretations and case law are not static. The 
development of constitutional rights of students added a 
new basis of authority for public school administrators. 
As Dee Schofield points out in Student Rights and 
Student Discipline, the courts, especially since the 1954 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, have 
come to the fore in the continuing struggle to define 
rights of students and implicitly define the relationship 
between student and school. The ascendancy of courts in 
matters relating to student rights and discipline results 
not only from the inability of legislative bodies to come 
22Ibid., p. 1281. 
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to terms with issues, but also from attention to civil 
23 liberties evident in the past two decades. 
Joseph Bryson in addressing the 1983 Law and Sports 
Conference at Guilford College refers to federal judges and 
to a much less extent state judges as the "new breed of 
education philosophers" and emphasized that it is those 
federal courts which have been the makers and shapers of 
24 
much of the education philosophy since the late Sixties. 
H. Design Of The Study 
The study is divided into three major parts: the 
review of the literature, the discussion of the legal cases 
establishing in loco parentis and cases establishing 
constitutionally protected rights of students, and the 
conclusions. 
Chapter two reviews literature relating to the 
development of the concept of in loco parentis. It includes 
an historical perspective of the concept. This chapter uses 
case law to trace the concept of in loco parentis as a basis 
of authority in American education. 
Chapter three provides a historical and legal framework 
for the establishment of constitutionally protected rights of 
23 
Dee Schofield, Student Rights and Student Discipline 
(Arlington, Virginia: National Association of Elementary 
School Principals, 1975), p. 10. 
^4Joseph Bryson in Law and Sports Conference 
Proceedings (Greensboro, North Carolina: Guilford College, 
June 6-10, 1983), pp. 44-45. 
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students. The discussion of two major influences in the 
society i.e. the Civil Rights Movement and the Student 
Protest Movement provides information on societal changes 
which influenced the courts and the court's influence on 
the societal changes. This chapter contains a general 
listing and discussion of recently litigated court cases 
which impact on public school administration and treat the 
concept of in loco parentis. It includes a narrative 
discussion of the major legal issues relating to the 
concept of in loco parentis and the change which was 
brought about by constitutionally protected rights of 
students and the impact on public school administration. 
Chapter four reviews and analyzes selected court deci­
sions establishing constitutionally protected rights of 
students provided by the first, fourth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. This 
chapter discusses the United States Supreme Court landmark 
cases influencing changes in public school administration 
as a result of constitutionally protected rights of stu­
dents . 
The concluding chapter of the study summarizes the 
information from the review of the literature and the 
analysis of the selected court cases and draws conclusions. 
Questions asked in the introductory part of the study are 
reviewed and answered in this chapter. Conclusions are 
indicated and programmatic recommendations are recorded. 
17 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A. Introduction 
B. Historical Perspective on the Development 
of the Concept of In Loco Parentis 
C. Selected Cases Demonstrating the History of the 
Concept of In Loco Parentis as a Basis of 
Authority in American Education. 
D. Selected Comment Demonstrating the Diminishing 
Use of In Loco Parentis as a Basis of Authority in 
American Public Education. 
E. Summary 
A. Introduction 
The concept of in loco parentis can be traced to 
Hammurabi. This chapter provides an overview of this 
concept. This historical background shows how the concept 
of in loco parentis became a significant concept in English 
Common Law. 
American Law had its roots in English Common Law. The 
application of the concept of in loco parentis to American 
Schools was significant in .the early development of the 
schools as an underlying basis of authority for teachers 
and administrators in matters concerning student governance 
and discipline. 
This chapter includes an historical perspective of the 
concept of in loco parentis and selected cases which 
demonstrate the in loco parentis concept as a basis of 
18 
authority. A selection of comments by educators is 
included in order to illustrate the influence of 
constitutional rights on the interpretation of in loco 
parentis as a basis of authority. 
B. Historical Perspective on the Development 
of the Concept of In Loco Parentis 
Hammurabi's Code 
Roman Law 
Concept of Patria Potestas 
Concept of Tutor 
Concept of Guardian (Patroni Loco) 
Evolution of English Common Education 
Hammurabi's Code 
The concept of in loco parentis is a legal concept 
which can be traced from the Hammurabian period to the 
present. Hammurabi's Code was one of the first recorded 
legal codes. The father's control over his children was 
unlimited until their marriage. The father could dispose 
of their labor and even of their persons for profit. 
Daughters might be given in marriage, as religious, or as 
concubines. The father was the head of the household and 
thus had specified rights.* 
Parents were assumed to have a natural right to 
control and exercise authority over offspring unless 
limited by local custom or codes of law. As man developed 
"'"Robert Francis Harper. The Code of Hammurabi King of 
Babylon About 2250 B.C. (Chicago: The University Press, 
1904), p.2. 
19 
and recorded his laws, parental rights began to be abro­
gated . 
Roman Law 
The first Roman recorded legislation, the Twelve 
Tables, after years of evolutionary process emerged about 
2 the middle of the fifth century B.C. This legislation 
demonstrated that the Romans were one of the first nations 
to formally modify parental power through governmental 
action and law. 
Buckland points out that beginning with the Twelve 
Tables, over 800 leges and plebiscita were recorded in the 
space of 500 years. Even excluding those of temporary 
3 
political interest, a vast collection of laws remains. 
Early Roman law gave the father absolute, control over 
his children. He had the essential right of ownership. 
This included the right to use the son's services, the 
right to part with them and the right to kill the child. 
Gradually the father ceased being a proprietor, or owner 
and became the natural protector and guardian of his 
4 
children. According to Moran, the Emperor Hadrian 
2 Hans Julius Wolff, Roman Law, An Historical Introduc-
tion (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 
1951), p. 55. 
3 
William W. Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman 
Private Law (Cambridge: The University Press, 1983), p. 1. 
^W. A. Hunter, Roman Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1903), p. 192. 
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modified parental power to the extent of reducing infanti­
cide. During Hadrian's reign, a wise maxim prevailed: 
"patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate 
consistere.11 (Parental powers ought to consist in devotion, 
not in harshness.)^ Eventually, the concept of paternal 
supremacy was reduced; it was however, never wholly aban­
doned . 
Concept of Patria Potestas 
Patria potestas is a latin term meaning the power of 
the father. Historically it refers to the power wielded by 
the father over his family. 
The doctrine of patria potestas limited to some extent 
the absolute authority of Roman parents. Patria potestas 
was the name for the rights enjoyed by the head of a Roman 
family over his legitimate children. Roman citizens prided 
themselves in the authority that they had over their child­
ren. A child who was an heir had no power until the time 
that the father would recognize his power.^ 
Concept of Tutor 
Tutor is a latin term meaning guardian. The tutor 
concept grew out of the patria potestas practice and became 
an important legacy of Roman law to Western Civilization 
5 Kaye Don Moran, An Historical Development of The 
Doctrine Loco Parentis With Court Interpretations In the 
United States (University of Kansas, 1967), p. 14. 
^Ibid., p. 15. 
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and to American law. The tutor contrasted with potestas. 
While he power of pater-familias was natural ownership, the 
tutor's powers resulted from a position of trust establish­
ed for the exclusive benefit of the pupillus. The primary 
purpose of the protection given by the tutor was to safe­
guard the property of his ward in the interests of succes­
sors . The tutor was not allowed to reap any personal 
advantage from his relationship with his ward or pupil. 
The tutor dealt primarily with the child and his property. 
A father could by law will a tutor for his children so that 
7 their interests would be looked after properly. 
Concept of Guardian (Patroni Loco) 
The purpose of the guardian or patroni loco was to 
educate and look after children. Moran pointed out that 
important principles evolved from Roman law: 
1) Parents had a duty to educate their child­
ren; 2) parents had the right to delegate their 
authority to another person, as tutor or guardian 
(patroni loco) for the purpose of educating and 
looking after their children; and 3) parents, when 
delegating their authority to a second person, 
delegated the right to chastise or punish their 
children. These legal principles have survived 
through the ages with minor changes to the Chris­
tian era and English common law. 
The delegation of authority to a second person and 
of the right to chastise their children has great 
^Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
8Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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significance in the evolution of the concept of in loco 
parentis. The limitations which are placed on this delega­
tion of authority constitute the bases of concern for much 
of the litigation discussed in this study. 
Evolution of English Common Education 
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England provides the earliest recorded legal phrase in loco 
parentis applied to the teacher-pupil relationship. This 
four volume treatise by Sir William Blackstone, published 
in 1765, became the basic textbook for the training of 
several generations of American lawyers necessitating 
9 innumerable American editions. 
Blackstone analyzed the legal contemplation of the 
parent-child relationship dividing the duties of parents 
toward legitimate children into three categories of main­
tenance, protection, and education. Blackstone also dis­
cussed the relationship of parental duties to parental 
power: 
The power of parents over their children is derived 
from the former consideration, their duty: this 
authority being given them partly to enable the 
parent more effectually to perform his duty, and 
partly as a recompense for his, care and trouble in 
the faithful discharge of it. 
9 
Emma Jan Hirschberger, A Study of The Development of 
The In Loco Parentis Doctrine, Its Application And Emerging 
Trends (University of Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 36. 
1^William Blackstone, Commentaries on The Law of Eng­
land (Portland, Thomas B. Wait and Company, 1807), p. 451. 
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Blackstone used the term loco parentis for the first 
time when he discussed the power of a father: 
He may also delegate part of this parental autho­
rity during his life, to the tutor or school-master 
of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has 
such a portion of the power of the parents commit­
ted to his charge, viz. that of restraint and 
correction as may be necessary.^to answer the 
purposes for which he is employed. 
Hirshberger concluded that this appears to be the legal 
foundation of the in loco parentis concept of the 
teacher-pupil relationships in the law. In assigning in 
loco parentis status to the school teacher, Blackstone 
applied a basic principle of common law-the importance of 
the customs and practices of the people. Hirschberger 
documented customs and practices from the sixth century to 
12 the middle of the eighteenth century. 
Summary 
Important principles were established by Roman law 
concerning the power of the parent. Of greatest importance 
was the fact that parents had a right and a responsibility 
to raise their children, to chastise them when necessary 
and to provide for their future in terms of property and 
succession. Under Roman law parents had the right to 
appoint another adult to act as a tutor or guardian for 
their children. Roman law was an important basis for the 
^Hirschberger, pp. 38-39. 
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concept of in loco parentis i.e. the basis for the legal 
delegation of parental authority. 
The importance of English common law to the concept of 
in loco parentis was the fact that since guardianship and 
in loco parentis originated together, one was tied to the 
legality of the other. The right of the parent to delegate 
his authority led to the delegation of parental rights to 
tutors and became allied with the right of punishment. 
C. Selected Cases Demonstrating the History 
of the Concept of In Loco Parentis as a Basis 
of Authority in American Education 
While Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 
established the legal foundation of the in loco parentis 
concept of the teacher-pupil relationship, Chancellor James 
Kent's Commentaries on American Law in 1827 cemented it 
into the American legal system. Writing early in a period 
of rapid development of the American system of public 
education, Kent had a great influence on the development of 
school law during the nineteenth century. While Lord 
Blackstone in speaking of the delegation of a portion of 
the power of the parent to the teacher conveyed a somewhat 
limited concept of transfer, Chancellor Kent speaks of the 
delegation to the teacher of all the powers allowed by law 
to the parent, thus conveying a total concept of transfer 
13 
of parental power. 
13Ibid., pp. 59-62. 
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Case law in the United States demonstrates in loco 
parentis concept as it has applied to American public 
elementary and secondary schools. 
Two early cases which did not use the term in loco 
parentis but which were based on the right of the teacher 
to administer corporal punishment were Commonwealth v. 
Fell^ (1833) and State v. Pendergrass^ (1837) . 
Judge Gaston in giving the opinion of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Rachel Pendergrass 
(1837) discussed the power which the law grants to school­
masters and teachers with respect to the correction of 
their pupils comparing that power to the power of parents: 
One of the most sacred duties of parents, is 
to train up and qualify their children, for be­
coming useful and virtuous members of society? this 
duty cannot be effectually performed without the 
ability to command obedience, to control stubborn­
ness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad 
habits; and to enable him to exercise this salutary 
sway, he is armed with the power to administer 
moderate correction, when he shall believe it to be 
just and necessary. The teacher is the substitute 
of the parent; is charged in part with the perfor­
mance of his duties, and in the exercise of^^hese 
delegated duties, is invested with his power. 
This early case in addition to confiding in school-master 
and teachers a discretionary power in the infliction of 
"^Commonwealth v. Fell, 11 Haz. PA. Reg. 179 (1833). 
"^State v. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. 348 (1837) . 
16Ibid., pp. 365-366 (1837). 
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punishment upon their pupils also clarified the limits of 
the power: 
When the correction administered, is not in 
itself immoderate, and therefore beyond the 
authority of the teacher, its legality or illega­
lity must depend entirely, we think, on the qui 
animo with which it was administered. Within the 
sphere of his authority, the master is the judge 
when correction is required, and of the degree of 
correction necessary; and like all others intrusted 
with a discretion, he cannot be made penally 
responsible for error^f judgement, but only for' 
wickedness of purpose. 
The court determined that school-masters and teachers would 
not be criminally responsible unless there was permanent 
injury to the child or the punishment was inflicted to 
gratify the teacher or master's own evil passions: 
But the master may be punishable when he does 
not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly 
abuse them. If he use his authority as a cover for 
malice, and under pretence of administering 
correction, gratify his own bad passions, the mask 
of the judge shall be taken off, and he will stand 
amenable to justice^ as an individual not invested 
with judicial power 
Two distinct lines of authority exist in the United 
States with respect to the role of a parent or a person in 
loco parentis in the administration of corporal punishment. 
One view makes the teacher the arbiter or the judge of the 
nature and amount of punishment? the other view stresses 
that courts deciding these cases hold that both the 
"^Ibid., pp. 366 - 367. 
18Ibid., p. 367. 
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reasonableness of, and the necessity for, the punishment is 
to be determined by a jury, under the circumstances of each 
case. 
State v. Pendergrass was a landmark case in establish­
ing the precedent that unless permanent injury results or 
the act was done in malice, the teacher is protected by in 
loco parentis; 
The minority view which is the older view, in 
this country, stems from the Pendergrass case 
This view holds that unless permanent injury 
results from the teacher's act or unless the act 
was done with malice, the defendant is within the 
protection of the in loco parentis rule. The 
Pendergrass formula makes the teacher the arbiter 
or the judge of the nature and amount of punish­
ment. 
Under the Pendergrass rule, the teacher stands 
in a quasi-judicial capacity. The teacher is not 
liable for an error in judgement? he is not liable 
even if it might appear to a jury thatgthe punish­
ment was not in line with the offense. 
Stevens v. Fasset, (1847) was the first appellate 
court to apply the loco parentis phrase to the teacher-
20 
pupil relationship. In this Maine Case Calvin Fasset, 
who was over twenty-one and had put himself under the 
instruction of a master at the public town school, was 
permitted by the instructor to occupy the desk and seat 
appropriated for the instructor, but for no specified time. 
On being requested to leave the desk, and having refused, 
19 
Hirschberger, p. 121. 
Stevens v. Fasset, 27 Me 275(1874). 
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the teacher obtained the aid of the plaintiff, who was an 
agent of the district, and upon express refusal of Calvin 
to leave the desk, the plaintiff, with the assistance of 
the master, attempted by force to remove him, but the force 
though properly exerted for such a purpose, was ineffec­
tual. This was an action for a malicious prosecution 
because of the defendant's having obtained two warrants 
21 
against the plaintiff, for assault and battery. 
The rationale for punishment is significant: 
If the teacher is authorized to inflict 
corporeal punishment for the purpose of securing 
obedience to his reasonable rules and commands, and 
thereby to render the school, what it is 
contemplated by the law that it shall be, it 
follows that he has the right to direct, how and 
when each pupil shall attend to his appropriate 
duties, and the manner in which they shall demean 
themselves, provided, that in all this, nothing 
unreasonable is demanded. It cannot be contended, 
that as the teacher has responsible duties to 
perform, he is not entitlg^ to the reasonable means 
by which to perform them. 
The court reasoned that if a person presents himself as a 
pupil and is accepted as such, he cannot claim the privi­
leges of a pupil without accepting the responsibilities of 
the pupil. Thus if he is disobedient, he is not exempt 
23 
from the liability of punishment. 
21 
Ibid. 
22Ibid., p. 281 (1847). 
23Ibid., pp. 281 - 282. 
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The court clarified the in loco parentis position when 
it discussed the common law right of the parent to keep the 
child in order and obedience: 
He may lawfully correct his child, being under 
age, in a reasonable manner, for this is for the 
benefit of his education. He may delegate also a 
part of his parental authority during his life, to 
the tutor or school-master of his child, who is 
then in loco parentis, and has such portion of the 
power of the parent, committed to his charge, viz. 
that of restraint and correction, as may be neces­
sary to answer the purpose for which he is em­
ployed. 
"The rights of parents (over their children,) 
result from their duties. As they are bound to 
maintain and educate their children, the law has 
given them the right to such authority; and in 
support of that authority, a right to the exercise 
of such discipline as may be requisite for the 
discharge of their sacred trust." "The power 
allowed by law to the parent over the person of the 
child, may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, 
the better to accomplish the -purposes of 
education." 2 Kent's Com. 169 & 170. 
Several rules emerged from this case: 
1. A person over twenty-one is subject to the 
authority of the teacher because he has chosen 
to be a pupil. 
2. The teacher has the right to use reasonable 
physical force against a pupil to require 
obedience to his lawful commands under the in 
loco parentis doctrine. 
24Ibid., pp. 279 - 280. 
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3. A teacher must maintain order and discipline 
in order to perform his duties. 
4. A teacher has the right to use the assistance 
of another against a pupil in circumstances in 
A..**!* ' 4 
which he is empowered to act. 
5. A court officially recognizes the authority of 
a public school teacher on the same basis as 
if he had been directly employed by the 
4- 25 parents. 
2 6 
Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) was the first corporal 
punishment case in which the state supreme court used the 
phrase in loco parentis. In this case the court imposed 
more restrictions on the use of corporal punishment by 
further defining the conditions which constitute reasonable 
punishment i.e. the cause must be sufficient, the instru­
ment used must be suitable to the purpose, and the manner 
and extent of the correction should be distinguished with 
the kindness, prudence and propriety which become the 
station of in loco parentis. 
The court considered teachers acting in loco parentis 
stating: 
Teachers should, therefore understand that 
whenever correction is administered in anger or 
insolence, or in any other manner than in 
25 
Hirschberger, p. 69. 
^Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Indiana 290 (1853) . 
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moderation and kindness, accompanied with that 
affectionate moral suasion so eminently due from 
one placed by the law 'in loco parentis'—in the 
sacred relation of parent—the Courts must consider 
them guilty of assault and battery, the more 
aggravated and wanton in proportion to th^ tender 
years and dependent position of the pupil. 
28 In Lander v. Seaver , (1859) the court addressed the 
concept of the school-master standing in loco parentis, 
invested with all the authority and immunity of the parent. 
The court discussed the power of control and correction 
invested in the parent by nature and necessity. According 
to the court, the power springs from the natural relation 
of parent and child. It is felt as a duty rather than a 
power. The court reasoned that parental power is little 
liable to abuse, because it is continually restrained by 
natural affection, the tenderness of a parent for his 
offspring, and acting rather by instinct than reasoning. 
The court however distinguished the power of the 
school-master as one in which there is no such natural 
restraint. Thus, according to the court, he may not safely 
be trusted with all a parent's authority, for he does not 
act from the instinct of parental affection. 
The court clarified its position: 
The law, as we deem it to exist, is this: A 
school-master has the right to inflict reasonable 
corporeal punishment. He must exercise reasonable 
O Q 
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, Am. Dec. 161-162 (1859). 
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judgement and discretion in determining when to 
punish, and to what extent. In determining upon 
what is a reasonable punishment, various considera­
tions must be regarded, the nature of theoffense, 
the apparent motive and disposition of the offen­
der, the influence of his example and conduct upon 
others, and the sex, size, and strength of the 
pupil to be punished. 
The court determined that if there is any reasonable doubt 
whether the punishment was excessive, the master or teacher 
should have the benefit of the doubt. 
Lander v. Seaver, brought about the emergence of three 
legal principles: 
1) that a teacher may punish a pupil for an offense 
after he returns home, if the misbehavior bears 
directly upon the school or the teacher 
2) that the teacher is not a public officer with certain 
juridicial and discretionary powers 
3) that the correct loco parentis concept is a limited 
delegation of parental power to the school teacher. 
This case also made the teacher liable to the pupil in a 
civil action as well as a criminal action, nlike the parent 
30 
who was liable in a criminal action only. 
31 
People v. Curtis, (1931) was significant because it 
distinguished the development of two lines of authority in 
29Ibid., p. 163. 
30Ibid., pp. 73-80. 
^^People v. Curtis, 300 P. 802 (1931). 
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cases involving in loco parentis. This California case 
involved an appeal from the judgement and the order denying 
the motion for a new trial. The appellant, a teacher in 
the public schools, had been found guilty in a trial by a 
magistrate, without a jury, and judgment and sentence 
imposed upon the defendant that she pay a fine of $100, or 
in default of the payment, that she be imprisoned in the 
county jail in proportion of one day's imprisonment for 
every $10 of the fine. 
The court distinguished the first line of authority: 
In the absence of statutory provisions, the 
common-law rule seems to be that a parent or a 
teacher (who stands in loco parentis) may inflict 
reasonable (or moderate) corporal punishment upon a 
child. Upon this phase of the law there seems to 
be no disagreement among the authorities. But when 
we come to the question of the quantum of punish­
ment, or rather of the determination of the reason­
ableness of the punishment inflicted, we find two 
distinct lines of authority. One group makes the 
teacher the arbiter, and declares all punishment to 
be reasonable which does not result in disfigure­
ment of or permanent injury to the child, and which 
is not inflicted maliciously. The locus classicus 
on this subject seems to be State v. Pendergrass, 
19 N. C. ,12 Devereux & Battle's Law) 365, 31 Am. 
Dec. 416. 
The court discussed a second line of authority in the in 
loco parentis rule: 
The second group of cases, and the one which, 
to our mind, expresses the most enlightened view—a 
view more consonant with modern ideas relating to 
the relationship between parents or those standing 
in their place and children—refuses to make the 
32Ibid. 
34 
teacher the sole arbiter. The courts deciding 
these cases hold that both the reasonableness of, 
and the necessity for, the punishment is to be 
determined by- a jury, under the circumstances 
of each case. 
The court specified the sources of authority for this 
more enlightened view: 
While some authority is cited tending to 
support the theory that where the punishment falls 
short of maiming or disfiguring the body, or 
seriously injuring or endangering life and health, 
the judgment of the parent is final, and he cannot 
be held to answer unless it is proved that the 
punishment was maliciously inflicted-the leading 
case in support of this doctrine being State v. 
Jones, 95 N. C. 588, 50 Am. Rep. 282-yet the great 
weight of American authority seems to be that 
whether or not the parent, guardian, or school­
master has administered unreasonable, unnecessary, 
and cruel punishment to a child under his care_is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
The minority view of the in loco parentis rule had 
held that the person administering the punishment is the 
judge, thus making the teacher the judge of when to punish 
and how much punishment to administer. In a modern view 
the great weight of American authority, seems to be 
that whether or not the parent, guardian or school­
master had administered unreasonable, unnecessary, 
and cruel punishment to a child under his care,is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
The basic distinction between the two rules appears to 
be that the teacher is not the sole judge of the necessity 
33Ibid., p. 803. 
34Ibid. 
35 
Hirschberger, p. 125. 
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for and the quantum of punishment in the newer or more 
modern rule. 
The majority view of the in loco parentis rule holds 
that a parent or person in loco parentis must not exceed 
the bounds of moderation and unreasonableness in inflicting 
corporal punishment. Acts that are judged cruel merciless, 
unreasonable and immoderate are unlawful. 
3 6 Guerrieri et ux. v. Tyson et al. (1942) was a case 
in which public school teachers immersed a 10 year old 
pupil's hand with infected finger in scalding water against 
his will and held it there for about 10 minutes causing 
intense pain and necessitating 28 days hospital treatment 
and permanent disfigurement of the hand. The teachers were 
liable for damages resulting where treatment was not 
immediately necessary and there emergency. 
This case is of significance to this study because it 
more narrowly defined the parameters of legally defensible 
delegated parental authority: 
Under the delegated parental authority implied 
from the relationship of teacher and pupil, a 
teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punishment 
on a pupil to enforce discipline (Harris et al. v. 
Galilley, Appellant, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 189 A. 
779) but there is no implied delegation of 
authority to exercise her lay judgment, as a parent 
may, in the matter of the treatment of injury or 
disease suffered by a pupil. Treatment of the 
minor plaintiff's hand was not necessary in this 
^Guerreri v. Tyson, 24 A. 2d 469 (1942). 
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case; defendants were not acting in an emergency. 
The defendants were not school nurses and neither 
of them had any medical training or experience. 
Whether treatment of the infected finger was 
necessary was a question for the boy's parents to 
decide. The status of a parent, with some of the 
parent's privileges, is given a school teacher by 
law in aid of the education and training of the 
child (see Act of May 18, 1911, P.I. 309,§ 1382) 
and ordinarily does nqt extend beyond matters of 
conduct and discipline. 
This case set a legal precedent concerning the limits 
of in loco parentis authority: 
Though public school teacher stands in "loco 
parentis" to pupil and, under delegated parental 
authority implied from relationship of "teacher and 
pupil", may inflict reasonable corporal punishment 
on pupil to enforce discipline, there is no implied 
delegation of authority to exercise her lay judge­
ment as a parent may in matter of „ treatment of 
injury or disease suffered by pupil. 
Cases litigated on the issue of use of corporal 
punishment or physical restraint against a pupil have 
become legal landmarks. These cases defined the fund­
amental legal relationship of teacher and pupil as one in 
which the teacher stands in loco parentis. 
Two cases which dealt with restraint were Calway v. 
Williamson, (1944) and Andreazzi v. Rubano, (1958). Calway 
v. Williamson,39 (1944) determined that the test for 
reasonable acts of restraint against a pupil are the same 
38Ibid., 468. 
39Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36A. 2d 377 
(1944) . 
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rules which are applicable in corporal punishment cases 
with in loco parentis as the legal foundation of both 
40 
practices. In Andreazzi v. Rubano, (1958), the Court 
inferred that a school board rule regulating the use of 
corporal punishment does not affect the right of the 
teacher to use restraint to enforce discipline. 
41 State v. Straight (1959) is significant to this 
study because it discusses two interpretations of law 
discussed earlier in the 1931 People v. Curtis decision. 
This case is an appeal from a judgment of conviction on a 
jury verdict for the crime of assault in the third degree. 
The defendant had been charged with assault in the second 
degree and the conviction of the lesser crime was found by 
a jury. The jury and the court fixed punishment for the 
maximum of third degree assault, six months in jail and a 
fine of $500. 
The defendant was a rural Montana school teacher who 
had been caring for a cousin's three minor children. The 
29 month old baby allowed the one year old to get out of 
the automobile while the defendent was in the home of 
someone to pick up Beulah straight's oldest daughter. The 
temperature outside was twenty degrees below zero. The 
^Andreazzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A. 2d. 639 
(1958) . 
^State v. Straight, 347 P. 2d 489. 
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fingers on both hands of the one year old were severely 
frozen. Because of what must have been considered by the 
defendant as bad behavior of the 29 month old the defendant 
spanked or beat the 29 month old with his belt. 
Evidence presented to the jury showed that the child 
had been beaten and his body was bruised and black and 
blue. The physician testified that he had found bruises 
two inches long and one inch wide on the child's chest and 
lower abdomen; his buttocks and legs were bruised and his 
42 
penis scratched and swollen and his scrotum scratched. 
The defendant offered no testimony whatever. The 
court questioned whether one standing in loco parentis is 
entitled to a presumption of innocence or whether the 
prosecution should be required to prove either permanent 
injury or implied malice. The alternative to this proce­
dure would be to allow the jury to determine whether the 
person standing in loco parentis "wilfully, wrongfully and 
unlawfully" assaulted the child, without giving the defen­
dant the benefit of the presumption that his acts are 
correct and not requiring the prosecution to provide 
permanent injury or malice.43 
Both views receive support in many jurisdictions. The 





"One standing in loco parentis, exercising the 
parent's delegated authority, may administer 
reasonable chastisement to a child or pupil to the 
same extent as the parent himself; and to fasten 
upon him the guilt of criminality he must not only 
inflict on the child immoderate chastisement but he 
must do so malo animo, with legal malice or wicked 
motives, or else^^he must inflict on him some 
permanent injury." 
The court notes the opposite and more enlightened view: 
the more enlightened view—a view more 
consonant with modern ideas relating to the rela­
tionship between parents or those standing in their 
place and children—refuses to make the teacher the 
sole arbiter. The courts deciding these cases hold 
that both the reasonableness of, and the necessity 
for, the punishment is to be determii^d by a jury, 
under the circumstances of each case. 
The court supported the People v. Curtis rule: 
A parent, teacher, baby-sitter or anyone else 
standing in loco parentis is not given unlimited 
discretion in the mode or degree of chastisement 
under our statute. Some cases in other jurisdic­
tions go so far as to say that one standing in loco 
parentis acts in a quasi judicial capacity and has 
almost unlimited discretion regarding the punish­
ment of the child entrusted to his care. This 
court expressly disapproves of this view. 
The Court also determined that the jury was properly 
left to decide this question without giving the defendant 
the benefit of a presumption that his actions were neces­






is protected in that the prosecution must show that his 
actions were unreasonable in manner and immoderate in 
degree. 
The judgment was affirmed. 
D. Selected Comment Demonstrating the Diminishing 
Use of In Loco Parentis as a Basis of Authority 
in American Public Education 
This section reviews a more recent comment on the 
concept of in loco parentis and its diminishing use as a 
basis of authority in American public education. 
Robert Phay examined "the long-recognized right of 
parents to decide educational issues that affect their 
children and then the doctrinal bases for the independent 
47 assertion by children of their own rights." Supreme 
Court cases which established a constitutional basis upon 
which to predicate parental prerogatives, i.e. Meyer v. 
48 49 
Nebraska, (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), 
50 
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) are inconsistent with a line of 
cases that locates in the child specific, constitutionally 
51 protected rights, i.e. Brown v. Board of Education 
47 Robert E. Phay, "Due Process and the Public Schools 
in the Seventies and Eighties," School Law Bulletin 13,4 
October, 1982 p. 3. 
4r 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). 
^Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972). 
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). 
41 
(1954) , Tinker v.Pes Moines Independent Community School 
District^ (1969) , Goss v. Lopez^ (1975) . 
Phay discussed early recognition of the child's 
constitutional rights in the Supreme Court decision of In 
54 
Re Gault (1967) in which the Court held that minors may 
not be denied basic procedural due process in proceedings 
that might result in their incarceration: 
The critical importance of the Gault holding 
and those related to it is that they locate the due 
process rights in the child himself. They endow 
the child with rights that the law is bound to 
protect regardless of the parents' wishes, and they 
replace the state's parens patriae function (guard 
over disabled persons such as minors) with the 
child's own substantive rights. Thus Gault and its 
successors began extending constitutional protec­
tion to minors, a process continued and expan^gd by 
a series of cases in the educational context. 
Thomas A. Gunn addressed issues regarding changes in 
the basis of authority for the use of corporal punishment 
in a 1974 article in the Baylor Law Review. He reviewed 
common law doctrine which defined teacher's authority as a 
partial delegation of parental authority: 
During the early period of our educational 
system, the doctrine of in loco parentis was a 
viable theory upon which the use of corporal 
punishment was based. As long as the relationship 
52 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975) . 
54In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). 
^Phay, p. 5. 
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between parent and teacher was consensual, the 
parent controlled the use of corporal punishment by 
selection of the person who would hold disciplinary 
control over his child. Also, the parent could 
terminate the selection if he became dissatisfied 
with the teacher. But, when a parent sends a child 
to school because the law so directs, he delegates 
no such power to the teacher. To suggest that the 
parent delegates unrestricted power, especially 
when he objects to corporal punishment, is a 
questionable proposition. A closer examination of 
the doctrine of in loco parentis is mandated in 
order to determine its current viability as a 
justification for corporal punishment. 
Gunn concluded that corporal punishment should not be 
classified as a special type of discipline requiring no 
constitutional safeguards. He concluded that in loco 
parentis was invalid as a basis of authority but argued for 
a true parental consent as a basis of authority for adminis­
tration of corporal punishment in the public schools: 
The doctrine of in loco parentis has been the 
traditional justification for granting school 
authorities the right to inflict physical punish­
ment on students within their tutelage. However 
valid the concept of in loco parentis may have once 
been, such validity has now ceased. No longer 
should a Latin phrase continue to vest such broad 
discretion in school authorities. The recognition 
that parents are possessed of a fundamental right, 
and indeed an obligation, to bring up their 
children as they see fit, mandates that parental 
rights take precedence over a doctrine that is no 
longer viable. In order to insure that parental 
rights to control children are protected in the 
area of corporal punishment, such physical punish­
ment should not be administered without prior 
parental consent. Only the requirement of parental 
56 
Thomas A. Gunn, "In Loco Parentis and Due Process: 
Should These Doctrines Apply to Corporal Punishment?", Baylor 
Law Review 26, 679 (1974). 
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approval prior to the infliction of corporal can completely 
guarantee the fundamental rights of parents to direct the 
57 
upbringing of their children. 
Case law has established some procedural protections 
in the administration of corporal punishment but has moved 
even further from the parental consent orientation. 
Cynthia Denenholz Sweeney in a study of substantive 
issues involving corporal punishment in public schools 
reviewed the doctrine of in loco parentis as a basis for 
the teacher's right to administer corporal punishment? 
parents delegated part of their right to discipline to the 
school. She demonstrated changes in this voluntary delega­
tion of authority to punish children in a public school: 
The justification for the imposition of 
corporal punishment, however, has shifted from the 
doctrine of in loco parentis to a view more in line 
with modern compulsory education law: to maintain 
group discipline and educate the schoolchild 
properly, the state itself may impose reasonable 
corporal punishment. The infliction of physical 
punishment also may be based upon parental consent 
or upon statutory authority. Most states statu­
torily authorize the teacher or principal to 
administer moderate corporal punishment, at least 
in certain situations. 
This study emphasized the changing bases of authority for 
administration of corporal punishment in public schools. 
57Ibid., p. 685. 
5 8 Cynthia Denenholz Sweeney, "Corporal Punishment in 
Public Schools: A Violation of Substantive Due Process?" 
The Hastings Law Journal 33, 1247 May 1982. 
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Sweeney argued that by asserting that students retain 
their rights while at school, Tinker^ and Goss^ establish­
ed that there are constitutional limits to school 
officials' authority to administer discipline.^* 
Hogan and Schwartz in their study of "The Fourth 
Amendment and the Public Schools" demonstrate how public 
schools are not exempt from the fourth amendment because of 
the in loco parentis authority over school children. The 
determination of the standard of reasonableness depends on 
the balancing process which requires a balancing of the 
need to search against the invasion which the search 
entails. The authors concluded: 
The following general conclusions emerge from 
this study. First, the traditional view, that the 
teacher or school administrator is a "quasi-parent" 
(in loco parentis) is inappropriate for the modern, 
compulsory public school context. School officials 
represent the state, and not the student's parents, 
when conducting a search, and therefore they cannot 
claim parental immunity form the fourth amendment. 
Second, the potential harm to the entire academic 
community from such unsettling elements as narco­
tics and weapons in the hands of juveniles requires 
some easing of the fourth amendment's search 
restrictions. Yet, a school search must always be 
reasonable, that is, it must be "justified as its 
inception" and "permissible in its scope." Final­
ly, state courts that want to require a more 
demanding standard for school searches may still do 
so but must base their decisions on state 
59 . 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969) . 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). 
^Sweeney, p. 1251. 
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constitutions^and statues, and not purport to apply the 
Constitution. 
Hirschberger, in A Study of The Development of The In 
Loco Parentis Doctrine, Its Application and Emerging Trends 
(1971) concluded that the judicial interpretation of the 
concept of in loco parentis has evolved into the process by 
which the courts control the activities and the development 
6 3 
of the American educational process. 
Two of Hirschberger's conclusions have significance 
for this study: 
The concept, in loco parentis, appears to have been 
extended to the nature and authority of the school 
itself in legal contemplation. American courts 
evaluate the legality of school board rules and 
regulations which govern students in the light of 
the in loco parentis functions of the school. 
As the school board is the legal arm of the State 
in the educational process, court interpretation of 
its in loco parentis authority has blended with the 
in loco parentis authority of the state, parens 
patriaee. The courts of the United States at both 
the state and federal levels have consciously 
guarded against the unlawful extension of the in 
loco parentis authority of the school as a creature 
of the State into the area of parental control of 
the child. 
Giesselmann, in his study In Loco Parentis and Its 
Application To The School Program: A Legal Guide for 
Administrators, focused on legal concepts and litigation 
6 2 
John C. Hogan and Mortimer D. Schwartz, "The Fourth 
Amendment and The Public Schools," Whittier Law Review, 7,2 
(Spring, 1985), p. 547. 
6 3 
Hirschberger, p. 246. 
64Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
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concerning student-administrator relationships relative to 
student governance and discipline and student care and 
safety. His principal findings which related to student 
governance and discipline were: 
1. The phrase in loco parentis describes the 
position of the school officials when acting in the 
place of parents concerning student governance and 
discipline and student care and safety while the 
pupil is under the jurisdiction of the school. 
2. Former perceptions concerning the in loco 
parentis positions of school officials relative to 
student governance and discipline have been re­
placed by a current judicial interpretation which 
considers the school administrator as an agent of 
state government. The following legal parameters, 
thus, relate to the exercise of administrative 
authority concerning student governance and disci­
pline: (1) actions must be based upon maintenance 
within the school of a proper atmosphere for 
learning; (2) rules, regulations, and all adminis­
trative procedures concerning student governance 
and discipline must demonstrate recognition of 
student constitutional rights and related student 
responsibilities; (3) substantive and procedural 
due process must be afforded all students in the 
school; and (4) curtailment of student rights must 
be based upon proof that specific exercises of such 
rights will materially interfere with or substan­
tially disrupt maintenance within the school of a 
proper atmosphere for learning. 
3. Subject to the above legal parameters, school 
officials have both the right and duty under in 
loco parentis to regulate and control student 
conduct within the school environment. 
Roy E. Howarth, writing in Phi Delta Kappa in 1972, 
reflected concern about denying the traditional prerogative 
•of in loco parentis and "the forced shift in teacher role 
^Giesselmann, pp. 232-233. 
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from in loco parentis to something resembling a quasi-legal 
dossier producer.A section of this article is included 
to reflect the types of concerns that educators and adminis­
trators voiced concerning the changing bases of authority 
in public schools: 
I submit that not a small part of teacher militancy 
is directly attributable to the marginal legal 
position that the teacher now occupies in the 
public schools. He no longer may identify himself 
with in loco parentis role in a given community 
without fear of recrimination from a parent who, 
under the auspices of the ACLU or some such group, 
will prosecute him for violation of some particular 
right. Traditional breaches of discipline which 
required only a short conference or even a deten­
tion period after school have been reinterpreted as 
meddlesome and repressive. It is interesting to 
note how language concerning student behavior has 
changed. One speaks today not of copying from 
another source, but of plagiarism and copyright 
laws; not of gossip and disrespect, but of libel 
and slander; not of violating school rules, but of 
trespassing and vandalism; not of conference and 
detention, but of hearing, misdemeanor, and felony; 
not of suspension or, in the extreme, expulsion, 
but of judgement, suit, and injunction; not of a 
"rumble," but of disturbing the peace or inciting 
to riot. These terms, indeed, reflect the real 
shift in student-teacher relationships that has 
been imposed upon the schools by the legal-minded 
and which work to destroy professional responsi­
bility for educating the whole child as it has been 
traditionally understood. 
The solutions to the above problem - if there are 
solutions - must be found in a new evaluation of 
the in loco parentis concept. As a parent, I 
expect of the school some help in educating my 
child in more than just intellectual ways. As a 
teacher, I question my obligation to teach the 
"whole child" in the light of today's litigation. 
Perhaps the legal-minded will find a way to define 
66Roy E. Howarth, "On The Decline of In Loco 
Parentis," Phi Delta Kappan, 53, 10 (June, 1972), p. 627). 
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the real quality of adolescence that they so desire 
to protect by placing hedges about school preroga­
tives. They, themselves, certainly must have 
sprung from the head of Solomon, uncorrupted by the 
evils of American education, to have seen so 
clearly how youth might be reared exclusively 
according to the prescriptions of constitutional 
law. 
The late 1960's and the 1970's brought dramatic change 
in students rights. The American Civil Liberties Union 
provided students with a view of in loco parentis; 
School officials often try to justify their 
interference in the students' private lives on the 
grounds that they are empowered to act in loco 
parentis. In other words, they say that parents, 
simply by sending their children to school, 
delegate their power to control the children's 
conduct to schoctL officials, who can then act in 
place of parent. 
E. Summary 
The review of the literature demonstrates that the 
concept of in loco parentis had as its basis early Roman 
law. This law emphasized that parents had a right and a 
responsibility to raise their children, to chastise them 
when necessary and to provide for their future in terms of 
property and succession. The right of the parent to 
delegate his authority led to the delegation of parental 
rights to tutors or schoolmasters and became allied with 
the right of punishment. 
67Ibid, p. 628. 
6 8 
Alan H. Levine and Eve Cary, The Rights of Students 
- The Basic ACLU Guide to A Students Rights (New York: Avon 
Books, 1977), p. 12. 
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English common law emphasized three duties of parents 
toward legitimate children: maintenance, protection and 
education. Blackstone's use of the term loco parentis 
appears to be the legal foundation of the in loco parentis 
concept of the teacher-pupil relationships in the law. 
Case law in the United States demonstrated the in loco 
parentis concept as it applied to American public elemen­
tary and secondary schools. 
Early case law gave school masters and teachers great 
discretionary power in the infliction of punishment upon 
their pupils. School masters and teachers were not held 
criminally responsible unless there was permanent injury to 
the child or proof of gratification of evil passions of the 
teacher. 
Later case law expressed a more enlightened view in 
regard to the relationship between parents and those 
standing in their place and children. The Courts held that 
the reasonableness of, and necessity for punishment is to 
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Elementary and secondary public school administration 
changed dramatically in the last twenty years. Administra­
tion of American public elementary and secondary schools 
changed as the bases of authority changed. The concept of in 
loco parentis diminished as a source of authority in public 
schools as students were extended constitutionally protected 
rights. States were forced to examine the hierarchy of the 
bases of authority with constitutionally protected rights of 
students taking precedence over state mandates in education. 
Dr. Joseph Bryson and Elizabeth Detty discussed how the 
federal courts got involved in issues determining jurisdic­
tion in education: 
...two principal ways through which federal courts 
obtain jurisdiction in litigation involving public 
education: (1) alleged violation of constitu­
tionally protected right, privilege, or immunity of 
an individual; and (2) validity questions of state 
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or federal statutes under the United States Consti­
tution. 
What are some of the significant changes that took 
place in the society and how did the Supreme Court reflect 
and sometimes serve as the catalyst for political and 
societal change? A major influence changing public school 
administration was the extension of constitutional rights 
to students. This can be seen more clearly by looking at 
the substantive issues which resulted in the extension of 
various constitutional rights and at the extension of 
procedural protections. Prior to 1969, public school 
students had no constitutionally protected rights. 
This chapter focuses on two selected influences in the 
society: the Civil Rights Movement and the Student Protest 
Movement. Numerous other major changes in the society 
influenced the direction of the law e.g. immigration, 
growth of technology, population explosion, and World War 
II. A study of these movements provides an understanding 
of the societal changes which influenced the courts. The 
Supreme Court initiated societal change through decisions 
which demanded great changes in society. These movements 
provide a framework for analyzing the changes in the bases 
of authority for public school administration. 
^Joseph E. Bryson and Elizabeth W. Detty, The Legal 
Aspects of Censorship of Public School Library and Instruc­
tional Materials (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie 
Company, 1982), p. 72. 
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B. Impact of the Civil Rights Movement 
The Civil Rights Movement was a campaign for the 
equality of American Blacks during the 1950's and 1960's. 
The primary emphasis of the movement was to attain voting 
rights, access to public accomodations, and economic 
opportunities for Blacks. 
In the early 1950*s, Blacks in the United States 
remained second-class citizens with great disparity of 
opportunity in politics, education, economy, housing and 
public accomodations. World War II military service, 
urbanization of American Blacks, and migrations to Northern 
cities brought renewed concern for equal rights for Blacks. 
The 1950"s began to bring a measure of prosperity 
and optimism to the industrially developed world 
and a massive amount of money was spent by the 
great powers, especially the U. S., first to 
contain the chaos left by the war, then to improve 
the general quality of life both at home and 
abroad. 
Pactions in the country were ready for dramatic 
societal change. One of the areas of great concern was 
equality for Blacks. The courts had determined that 
schools could be "separate but equal." This did not 
satisfy Blacks because the schools were separate but 
inherently unequal. 
2 
Harold G. Shane "Global Developments And Educational 
Consequences," The Future of Education: Policy Issues and 
Challenges ed. Kathryn Cirincione-Coles (Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publications, Inc.), 1981, p. 261. 
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The concept of separate but equal had come from Plessy v. 
3 
Ferguson (1896) which had provided for "separate but equal 
schools which were more separate than equal. 
Beginning in the 193O's the Supreme Court had begun to 
concern itself with this, "separate but equal" doctrine, but 
4 in the area of higher education e.g. Sweatt v. Painter 
(1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents For Higher 
Education^ (1950) . In May 1954 in Brown v. Board of 
Education®, the Supreme Court declared separate schools 
inherently unequal. 
This historic Brown decision began with the 
resolve of Thurgood Marshall and his associates to 
challenge not just unequal facilities, but segrega­
tion itself. Their efforts materialized in the 
landmark decision which declared that black child­
ren in America shall no longer be forced to attend 
school separately from white children. For some, 
this decision represented the dawn of a new era, 
offering aspiration and challenge, hope and faith 
to some people, bringing despair and anxiety to 
others. Small wonder that this historic event has 
been hailed as the greatest piece of legislation in 
the U. S. Supreme Court's history; one author 
stated that on Monday, May 17, 1954, the Court did 
more for justice than all of its predecessors. 
Small wonder, too, that the decision precipitated 
charges that the Supreme Court had usurped the 
powers of the Congress and the States to amend the 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, La, 16 S Ct 1138, 163 U.S. 537, 41 
L Ed 256. 
^Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
5 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents For Higher 
Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas et al. 347 
U. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
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Constitution, and warnings that the High Court must 
be curbed. Somewhere between these extremes was 
the viewpoint that if men of good will would look 
carefully at the logic, economics, sentiments, 
emotionalism, and morality involved in the ques­
tion, there was a good chance that the great change 
envisaged in Brown could be brought about without 
racial conflict and with no decline in the effec­
tiveness of the public school program. It is 
doubtful, however, that at the time of the Brown 
decision, this viewpoint was _ held by a wide 
spectrum of the American public. 
Jones summarizes the 1954 Brown decision: 
The Brown decision in 1954 was the culmination of a 
series of court battles to outlaw racial segre­
gation in the public schools of the United States 
of America. It stands as a symbol of a new era of 
liberation movements in the United States. Indeed 
the Brown decision embodied the concept and spirit 
of the 14th Amendment adopted in 1868, which was 
destined to affect virtually every aspect of 
Americans' relationships with each other. The 
effects of Brown reached some one hundred sixty 
million people. There were eight million white and 
two and one-half million black children of school 
age in those states primarily affected by the 
decision. This meant that for about 40 per cent of 
all school children in the United States, future 
adjustment was at stake. Any decision which 
affects so large a group, 160 million people, is 
bound to have far-reachigg social, political, and 
educational implications. 
Q 
In Brown II in 1955 the Court ordered that Blacks be 
admitted to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory 
7 
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basis "with all deliberate speed". State and local 
authorities adopted delaying schemes which ultimately 
resulted in intervention by the federal government through 
use of federal marshals and federal troops. 
The Report of the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest emphasized: 
...that throughout the sixties, black college stu­
dents played a central role in the civil rights 
movement. After four black students from North 
Carolina Agricultural and Technical College staged 
an historic sit-in at a segregated lunchcounter in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, in February 1960, the 
spread of sit-ins and other civil rights activities 
aroused the conscience of the nation and encouraged 
many students to express their support..-±or civil 
rights through nonviolent direct action. 
Sit-ins, wade-ins, freedom rides, boycotts, demon­
strations, marches began to gain public acceptance. Some 
experts date the culmination of the Civil Rights Movement 
with the march on Washington, August 28, 1963. 
Over two hundred thousand citizens massed in front 
of the Lincoln Monument in Washington, D. C., 
demonstrating to the nation that blacks were no 
longer willing to remain outside the American 
mainstream. Civil rights leader Martin Luther 
King, Jr. insisted that the time had come for 
American democratic idealism to become a reality 
for black Americans. This event influenced the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and may 
have had ^pronounced effect on desegregation in 
education. 
^°The Report of the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest (New York: Arno Press, 1970), P. 21. 
"^Jones, I, p. 21. 
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Jones discussed the impact of the Civil Rights Movement: 
Although the Civil Rights Movement had a positive 
effect on school desegregation efforts, it was not 
specifically aimed at ameliorating the plight of 
those in the public school system. Nevertheless, 
the Civil Rights Movement has been credited as 
having been foremost among the nation's out-of-
court factions influencing school desegregation 
efforts. The effectiveness of the Civil Rights 
Movement, though, began to wane immediately follow­
ing congressional passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. And the diminishing impact of the Civil 
Rights Movement was quickened by the untimely death 
of Malcolm X and, later, of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. • 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 legitimized the 
entry of federal initiative in the school desegre­
gation arena. But it took some time for the impact 
of the federal thrust to be reflected in the 
proportion of black students attending school with 
white students. 
In 1957 Congress passed the first civil rights law in 
eighty years. Martin Luther King, Jr. had been involved 
with a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. In 1957 he 
organized the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) in Atlanta. Its tactics were adapted from the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) which had been founded 
in Chicago in 1942. King also helped organize the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). SNCC was 
formally organized at Shaw University in Raleigh. This 
organization selected and trained members to endure verbal 
and physical abuse without resorting to violence. 
12Ibid, p.3. 
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Economic pressures were brought to bear with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 with provisions against discrimination 
or forfeiture of federal funds. 
The significance of the Civil Rights Movement for the 
purpose of this study is 1) By renewing the focus on civil 
rights, it made possible an atmosphere in which civil 
rights for students became a possibility; 2) Federal Court 
intervention in the implementation of desegregation in the 
public school gave the courts more involvement in what was 
happening in public schools; 3) The tactics employed in the 
Civil Rights Movement were used in the student protest 
movement. 
C. The Student Protest Movement 
The impact of student unrest on American society was 
pervasive. A sense of the power of the student protest 
movement is tantamount in the evaluation of the movement by 
the President's Commission on Campus Unrest: 
If this trend continues, if this crisis of under­
standing endures, the very survival of the nation 
will be threatened. A nation driven to use the 
weapons of war upon its youth is a nation on the 
edge of chaos. A nation that has lost the alleg­
iance of part of its youth is a nation that has 
lost part of its future. A nation whose young have 
become intolerant of diversity, intolerant of the 
rest of its citizenry, and intolerant of all 
traditional values simply because they are tradi­
tional has no generation worthy or capable of 
assuming leadership in the years to come. 
13 
The Report of the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest, p. 5. 
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The Commission summarized the student protest movement 
as a "crisis of understanding" focused on three major ques­
tions: racial injustice, war, and the university itself. 
The Commission reviewed America's history of common values, 
sympathies and dedication to a system of government which 
protects diversity and emphasized the "grave danger of 
losing what is common among us through growing intolerance 
14 
of opposing views on issues and of diversity itself". 
A "new" culture is emerging primarily among 
students. Membership is often manifested by 
differences in dress and life style. Most of its 
members have high ideals and great fears. They 
stress the need for humanity, equality, and the 
sacredness of life. They fear that nuclear war 
will make them the last generation in history. 
They see their elders as entrapped by materialism 
and competition, and as prisoners of outdated 
social forms. They believe their own country has 
lost its sense of human purpose. They see the 
Indochina war as an onslaught by a technological 
giant upon the peasant people of a small, harmless, 
and backward nation. The war is seen as draining 
resources from the urgent needs of social and 
racial justice. They argue that we are the first 
nation with sufficient resources to create not only 
decent lives for some, but a decent society for 
all, and that we are failing to do so. They feel 
they must remake America in its own image. 
But among the members of this new student 
culture, there is a growing lack of tolerance, a 
growing insistence that their own views must 
govern, an impatience with the slow procedures of 
liberal democracy, a growing denial of the humanity 
and good will of those who urge patience and 
restraint, and particularly of those whose duty it 
is to enforce the law. A small number of students 
have turned to violence; an increasing number, not 
terrorists themselves, would not turn even arson­
ists and bombers over to law enforcement officials. 
14Ibid, p.4. 
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At the same time, many Americans have reacted 
to this emerging culture with an intolerance of 
their own. They reject not only that which is 
impatient, unrestrained, and intolerant in the new 
culture of the young, but even that which is good. 
Worse, they reject the individual members of the 
student culture themselves. Distinctive dress 
alone is enough to draw insult and abuse. Increas­
ing numbers of citizens believe that students who 
dissent or protest-even those who protest peace-
fully-deserve to be treated harshly. Some even say 
that when dissenters are killed, they have brought 
death upon themselves. Less and less do students 
and the larger community seek to understand ,pr 
respect the viewpoint and motivations of others. 
Howard Becker emphasized that we cannot understand a 
complex event involving many groups by analyzing the 
origins of the behavior of just one group. Understanding 
the phenomena of campus unrest in the 1960's is a complex 
problem with numerous bases and far reaching implications. 
Becker looked at the problem of the campus power struggle 
in 1970 and stated: 
The troubles have been building for a long time, at 
least since the end of World War II when the 
college population began to swell with the increas­
ing proportion of the college-age group who went to 
college. The change in numbers, and the change in 
the kinds of people recruited as students and 
faculty, broke down existing accommodative patterns 
on many campuses. Veterans refused to wear beanies 
and abide by other hallowed campus traditions which 
new faculty and administrators were just as glad to 
give up. Faculty, whose bargaining position 
improved with every jump in the college population 
and in available research funds, refused to accept 
what they now came to see as an ill-paid, subser­
vient and degraded position. They demanded and got 
better. Well-established patterns of cooperation 
between deans and presidents, on the one hand, and 
•*"5Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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campus leaders in the student government and in the 
informal consortia of fraternities that often ran 
them, on the other, eroded as student numbers 
increased beyond what that system could success­
fully contain. Faculty and administration involve­
ment in defense research angered students whose 
politics questioned the morality of that research. 
None of these things happened in a day. Together, 
they produced a situation in which ̂  lot of people 
were unhappy about a lot of things. 
The President's Commission On Campus Unrest, in 
examining the background of student protest, pointed out 
that student discontent in America did not begin at 
Berkeley in 1964, or with the civil rights movement in the 
early 1960's: 
The history of American colleges during the 
early 19th century is filled with incidents of 
disorder, turmoil, and riot. These disturbances 
generally arose over poor food, primitive living 
conditions, and harsh regulations. Even today, 
such traditional complaints still spark many more 
campus protests than is generally realized. But 
though 19th century campus turbulence occasionally 
reflected a rebellion against the dominant Puritan 
religious ethic of the colleges of the time, 
student discontent here, unlike that in Europe, was 
largely apolitical. 
This pattern began to change during the early 
years of the 20th century, when the first important 
radical political movement among American college 
students-the Intercollegiate Socialist Society-
emerged. When the ISS flourished, it had more 
members, measured as a proportion of the total 
student population, than the Students for a Demo­
cratic Society (SDS) had in the late 1960's. 
During the 1920's, there were campus protests 
against ROTC, denunciations of the curriculum for 
its alleged support of the established system, and 
attacks on America's "imperialistic" foreign 
1^Howard S. Becker, ed. Campus Power Struggle (n.p.: 
Transaction Books, 1970), pp. 5-6. 
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policy. During the Depression, there was still 
greater student discontent. Polls taken during the 
1930's showed that a quarter of college students 
were sympathetic to socialism and that almost 40 
per cent said they would refuse to take part in 
war. There were many student strikes against war, 
a few disruptions, and some expulsions. 
Thus, it is not so much the unrest of the past 
half-dozen years that is exceptional as it is the 
quiet of the 20 years which preceded them. From 
the early 1940's to the early 1960's, American 
colleges and universities were uncharacteristically 
calm, radical student movements were almost non­
existent, and disruptions were rare. The existence 
of this "silent generation" was in part a reflec­
tion of the Cold War. But as the tensions of the 
Cold War lessened, students felt less obliged to 
defend Western democracy and more free to take a 
critical took at their own society. Once again the 
American campus became a center of protest. 
The report goes on to state that reemerging campus 
activism was reformist in its aims and nonviolent in its 
tactics; it pursued its goals by means of moral and poli­
tical persuasion. Obviously it did not persist in this 
form. In the autumn of 1964 a critical series of events at 
the University of California at Berkeley transformed campus 
activism. The Berkeley revolt did not explode in a vaccum; 
it was preceded by a chain of events during the late 1950*s 
and early 1960's which helped to revive campus activism. 
The most important development was the civil rights move­
ment. The peace movement, based on an abhorrence of 
nuclear weapons, was another important element in the 
1 7  . . .  The Report of the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest, pp. 20-21. 
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18 
background of student activism. 
The events at Berkeley in the autumn of 1964 "defined 
an authentic political invention-a new and complex mixture 
of issues, tactics, emotions, and setting-that became the 
19 
prototype for student protest throughout the decade". 
In brief, the events at Berkeley were these: In the 
summer of 1964, the university administration began en­
forcing an old rule which prohibited political groups from 
collecting money or soliciting memberships on campus. 
Until then, such activity had been allowed in one area at 
the edge of the campus. Campus activists found themselves 
deprived of their familiar turf. Incensed, they decided to 
violate the new prohibition, and university officials 
summarily suspended eight of them. 
On October 1, campus police arrested a nonstudent 
activist for trespassing. When they attempted to remove 
him in a campus police car, students spontaneously formed a 
sit-in which prevented the car and the occupants from 
moving for 32 hours. The crowd broke up when the univer­
sity agreed not to press charges. For the next two months, 
the issue of what political activity would be permitted on 
campus remained unsettled. The matter of university 
discipline was also unsettled. After a series of hearings, 
18Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
19Ibid, p. 22. 
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the university announced that six of the eight suspended 
students would be penalized only by suspension up to that 
time, and the other two would be placed on probation for 
the remainder of the semester. A week later, the same two 
students were informed that new disciplinary actions had 
been initiated because of their activities on October 1. 
After Thanksgiving vacation, the protest resumed. 
Leaders of the Free Speech Movement (PSM), which was formed 
by campus groups of all political persuasions to defend the 
right to organize on campus, began a large, two-day sit-in 
at the administration building. The sit-in came to an end 
when Governor Edmund G. Brown called in the police; hund­
reds were arrested and there were many charges of police 
brutality. 
Before the police intervention, the FSM actions were 
supported by a small fraction of the Berkeley student 
population-perhaps a total of 2,500. The police action and 
mass arrests mobilized huge numbers of students and faculty 
in support of the FSM goals. Classes and other activities 
came to a halt in an unprecedented strike against the 
university. 
In many respects, the Free Speech Movement succeeded. 
By January, the Chancellor had taken a "leave of absence," 
and the rules governing student political activity on 
campus had been liberalized. The campus slowly returned to 
a normal routine. Beneath the appearance of normalcy, some 
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things were no longer the same. The happenings at Berkeley 
had altered the character of American student activism in a 
fundamental way.^ 
Mario Savio was the leader of the Free Speech Movement 
on the Berkeley campus. In an interview with a New York 
Times Magazine correspondent Savio stated: 
It is a distortion, and too bad, that the 
university does not stand apart from the society as 
it is. It would be good to return to an almost 
totally autonomous body of scholars and students. 
But what we have now is that the Pentagon, the 
aircraft companies, the farm interests and their 
representatives in the Regents consider the 
university as a public utility, one of the re-
sources2jthey can look on as part of their busi­
nesses. 
The most distinctive aspect of the Berkeley invention, 
according to the President's commission was its success in 
combining two impulses that had been separate in student 
disruption: 
The high spirits and defiance of authority that had 
characterized the traditional school riot were now 
joined to youthful idealism an^to social objec­
tives of the highest importance. 
This intense feeling and vigorous political activism 
provoked reactions and overreactions that promised to keep 
the whole movement alive. 
20Ibid, pp. 23-24. 
21 New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1965, p. 89. 
22 The Report of the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest, p. 28. 
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A New York Times Magazine article emphasized the 
interplay of the various characteristic influences of the 
1960's. Among these are prosperity, the baby boom, aliena­
tion, and drug culture: 
A similar mood of irrationality, of vaporous 
but paralyzing apprehension, stalks all our insti­
tutions in a time of unmatched material prosperity 
and individual well-being. Young people, in parti­
cular, study the unemployment statistics and decide 
that society is in a conspiracy to provide security 
for the older generation at the expense of the 
youngsters outside waiting to get in. Education is 
the magic carpet over the hurdles that make the 
dropout the shutout in our society. But, even at 
this most distinguished of universities, bigness 
robs many students of individual dignity or pur­
pose. This feeling helps explain the spread of 
drug addiction and senseless crime among many 
well-to-do youngsters. All are part of an aliena­
tion that turns ^yen affluence and security into 
worthless prizes. 
Seymour L. Halleck in the article "Hypotheses of 
Student Unrest" emphasized the diversity of explanations of 
student unrest in order to demonstrate the intellectual 
futility of searching for simple explanations of a highly 
complex phenomena. He categorized the various hypotheses 
of student unrest: critical hypotheses, sympathetic and 
neutral. Critical hypotheses imply that something is wrong 
with those students who protest or withdraw: 
. Permissiveness Hypothesis - student unrest is a 
result of too much permissiveness in rearing 
children. 
23 
New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1965, P. 91. 
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. Responsibility Hypothesis - youth have become 
unwilling to assume responsibility for their own 
behavior. 
. Affluence Hypothesis - affluence creates a sense of 
restlessness, boredom and meaninglessness in youth. 
Hypotheses which put the student in a favorable light he 
termed sympathetic: 
. Two Armed Camps Hypothesis - the world is divided 
into two large camps which compete with each other 
idealogically, politically and militarily. 
. War in Vietnam Hypothesis - the Vietnam conflict has 
been a major factor influencing students. 
. Deterioration in the Quality of Life Hypothesis -
overpopulation, mass production, anonymity, over­
crowding, pollution are demonstrative of a deterior­
ation in the quality of life and student unrest is 
the response to this denial of a way of life. 
. Political Hopelessness Hypothesis - mass society is 
immutable to change. 
. Civil Rights Hypothesis - the Civil Rights Movement 
made students aware of historical injustice and 
served as a training ground for radicalism. 
Neutral hypotheses reside in changes in our highly complex 
society: 
. The Technology Hypothesis - rapidly expanding 
technology creates an atmosphere in which past, 
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present and future lose their inter-relatedness. 
. The Media Hypothesis - media influences the char­
acter structure of youth by prematurely confronting 
them with the harsh truths and realities of life. 
. The Overreliance on Scientism Hypothesis - the 
restless student takes the message of science, 
rationality and perfection too literally. 
These hypotheses and others demonstrate the intellectual 
futility of searching for simple explanations of student 
unrest.^ 
These hypotheses demonstrate a variety of explanations 
for student unrest. The variety and scope of the explana­
tions for student unrest demonstrate that there are no 
simple explanations. Critical hypotheses imply something 
is wrong with students who protest. Sympathetic hypothesis 
imply that something is wrong in the society. Neutral 
hypotheses emphasize the significance of change on 
students. These hypotheses viewed in their entirety 
demonstrate the complexity of the student unrest. 
Student unrest in the society became a catalyst for 
change. The student protest movement was nationwide. It 
became a training ground for civil rights activists. It 
24 .. 
Seymour L. Halleck, "Hypotheses of Student Unrest, 
Student Activism in America, ed. Julian Foster and Durevard 
Long (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.), 1970, pp. 
105-122. 
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created more awareness in the society on individual rights 
and a better understanding of how to protect and defend 
those rights. 
Certainly with the emphasis on First Amendment rights 
in the student protest movement it was just a matter of 
time before the issue became central in the public schools. 
Burnside v. Byars (1966) was an early inroad into consti­
tutional rights for students. Students wore "freedom 
buttons" to school in Philadelphia, Mississippi. When an 
announcement was made to the entire student body that the 
buttons were not permitted, students defied the dictate and 
wore the buttons again. Given an option to remove the 
buttons or be sent home, several refused and were sus­
pended. Three parents instituted injunctive proceedings 
against the school officials to enjoin them from enforcing 
the regulation on the grounds that it was unreasonable and 
abridged their children's First and Fourteenth Amendment 
freedom of speech. This case is significant because it 
recognized rights but stipulated that exercise of such 
rights could "not materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
25 " 
operation of the school". 
This implicit extension of rights was soon to be 
clarified by the Supreme Court. 
^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d, 749. 
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In 1967 the Supreme Court extended constitutionally pro­
tected rights to juveniles in the case of Gerald Gault. 
The Court ruled that when juvenile court proceedings could 
result in incarceration of a minor, certain constitutional 
2 6 safeguards must be provided. 
With the student protest movement waxing strong at 
institutions such as Berkeley, University of Michigan, 
Tufts, Yale, Ohio State University, University of Kansas, 
University of Washington, University of Chicago, CCNY, 
University of Wisconsin, Stanford et al. it was inevitable 
that the first amendment right of freedom of expression for 
public school elementary and secondary students would be an 
issue to be resolved. The Supreme Court did not deal with' 
this issue until Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community 
School District (1969) when the Court determined that 
school officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. The Court extended constitutional rights 
to students when it stated: 
Students in school as well as out of school are 
'persons* under our Constitution. They are 
possessed of fundamental rights which the State 
must respect, just as 4^ey must respect their 
obligations to the state.^ 
26In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 18L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 
1428. 
27 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 
393 U.S. 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed. 2d 740 (1969). 
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D. Diminishing Impact of In Loco Parentis 
in 1970's and 1980's 
Constitutionally protected rights for students dimi­
nished the authority of in loco parentis doctrine in 
elementary and secondary public school administration. The 
diminishing authority of in loco parentis is demonstrated 
in a discussion of these ideas: 
Constitutional rights for students replaced in loco 
parentis as basis of authority with regard to specific 
rights. 
Major Cases established and defined specific 
constitutional rights. 
Certain Legal Issues were identified in balancing 
necessary school authority with student's constitu­
tional rights. 
a. Substantive Issues 
b. Procedural Issues 
Significant constitutional issues had to be resolved 
in order to determine the extent of students' con­
stitutionally protected rights v. the concept of in 
loco parentis. 
Recent in loco parentis cases demonstrate a more 
"enlightened" rule. 
1. Constitutional rights for students replaced in loco 
parentis as basis of authority with regard to specific 
rights. 
a. First Amendment right of freedom of speech gave 
students the right to protest whereas in loco 
parentis administrative doctrine may or may not 
28 
have allowed any dissent. There were no inherent 
protections of freedom of speech for students. 
28 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 393 U.S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 731 (1969). 
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b. The Fourteenth Amendment application of rights 
to students required that a student could not be 
29 deprived of property without due process of law. 
Since a student held a property interest in an 
education, this meant that a protection was esta­
blished for students to keep them in school. In 
loco parentis public school administration had 
allowed administrators great liberty in represent­
ing the parent or representing an adult standard in 
keeping with the mores of the particular community. 
c. The application of the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure of 
students attending public elementary and secondary 
schools limited the power of public school adminis­
trators. Justice White applied the Fourth Amend­
ment prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures to public school officials when he stated: 
In determining whether the search at 
issue in this case violated the 
Fourth Amendment, we are faced 
initially with the question whether 
that Amendment's prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to searches conducted by 
public school-, officials, We hold 
that it does. 
29Goss V. Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 95S.Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 
725 (1975). 
"^New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 739 (1985). 
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Justice White in delivering the opinion of the 
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. discussed the in loco 
parentis argument used by a few courts as a basis of 
authority for teachers and administrators as if 
their authority is that of the parent, not the 
State, and as if it were not subject to the limits 
of the Fourth Amendment. Justice White stated: 
Such reasoning is in tension with 
contemporary reality and the teachings of 
this court. We have held school offi­
cials subject to the commands of the 
First Amendment, see Tinker v. Pes Moines 
Independent Community School District 393 
U.S.503 (1969), and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.565 (1975) . If 
school authorities are state actors for 
purposes of the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of expression and due process, 
it is difficult to understand why they 
should be deemed to be exercising paren­
tal rather than public authority w^n 
conducting searches of their students. 
d. The very basis of authority of in loco parentis 
is called into question by the Court since the 
Court has recognized that "the concept of paren­
tal delegation" as a source of authority is not 
entirely "consonant with compulsory education 
32 laws." This was emphasized again in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O. (1985). 
^*New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 741. 
"^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651, 662 (1977). 
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Today's public school officials do not 
merely exercise authority voluntarily 
conferred on them by individual parents; 
rather they act in furtherance of public­
ly mandated educational and disciplinary 
policies. See, e.g., the opinion in 
State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N. J., at 343, 
463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the 
New Jersey statutes regulating school 
disciplinary policies and establishing 
the authority of school officials over 
their students. In carrying out searches 
and other disciplinary functions pursuant 
to such policies, school officials act as 
representatives of the state, not merely 
as surrogates for the parents, and they 
cannot claim the parents' immunity frqij 
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 
Mary Hatwood Futrell, President of the Na­
tional Education Association, in a 1985 article 
discussed the T.L.O. ruling. The question in point 
was: Does the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unwarranted searches apply to students in the 
school setting? The Supreme Court clearly answered 
that students are protected against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by public school officials. 
School officials have a right to initiate a student 
search if they have "reasonable grounds." 
The key phrase here is "reasonable 
grounds." These words point to what I am 
convinced is the vital center of the 
T.L.O. ruling: the rejection of the in 
loco parentis doctrine. Had the Court 
affirmed this doctrine-which extends the 
full range of parental authority to school 
officials and lets these officials act in 
place of parents-it would have granted 
^New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 741. 
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schools power that is not appropriately 
theirs. Public schools would have been 
immunized against the need to respect 
students' Fourth Amendment rights. In 
its ruling, the Court took special care 
to keep the line between parental autho­
rity and school authority firm and 
distinct. The in loco parentis doctrine, 
it argued, "is jji tension with contem­
porary reality." 
Benjamin Sendor in assessing New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. stated that the ruling is significant not 
only for what the Supreme Court decided, but for 
what it did not decide. The Court decided that 
the Fourth Amendment limits the search power of 
all government officials from police officer to 
school authorities. The Court rejected the 
argument that school officials are shielded from 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment because 
of their in loco parentis role. Applying the 
Fourth Amendment to searches by school autho­
rities leads to the standards that govern these 
searches, viz. the need to balance the duty of 
school officials to maintain discipline against 
the privacy interests of students. The Court 
ruled that school officials do not need to obtain 
search warrants before searching students since 
the Fourth Amendment imposes on school 
^Mary Hatwood Futrell, "A Ruling For Learning," 
Education Week, February 20, 1985, p. 6. 
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administrators a lower standard of "reasonableness" 
to justify student searches. Unanswered questions 
for Sendor were: 
1. Must a school official have "indivi­
dualized suspicion" of misconduct by one 
or more students before searching those 
students? The court expressly declined 
to answer that question, but most courts 
that have used the "reasonableness" 
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court 
have imposed the requirement that school 
searches must result from suspicion about 
an individual student—not, say, about a 
group of students in general. What's 
more, the Supreme Court itself hinted in 
its decision that departures from that 
requirement should be the exception, not 
the rule. 
2. Does the standard of "reasonable­
ness" apply to searches of lockers, 
desks, and other school property provided 
to store school supples? Most courts 
have dispensed with the reasonableness 
standard when school officials notify 
students in advance that such areas are 
subject to searches without warning or 
reason, but the Supreme Court expressly 
sidestepped this issue, too. 
3. Is a higher level of suspicion 
required to justify the controversial 
practice of strip searches? Most courts 
have required both a higher level of 
suspicion and a charge of serious miscon­
duct, amounting to an emergency, to 
justify such an extraordinarily intrusive 
search, but the Supreme Court did not 
address the question. 
4. Is a higher level of suspicion 
required to justify a search in coopera­
tion with or instigated by the police? 
Once again, the Supreme Court did not 
address the question, but some courts 
have required probable cause to justify 
such searches. 
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5. If a search violates the rule of 
reasonableness; will the evidence seized 
will be admissible in court? Will it be 
admissible in a school disciplinary 
hearing? Most courts have excluded such 
evidence from court proceedings but ruled 
it admissible in school disciplinary 
proceedings, yet the Supreg^ Court 
declined to rule on this issue. 
2. Major cases established and defined specific constitu­
tional rights for students. 
First amendment rights extended freedom of speech 
to students and gave them the right to freedom of 
expression providing they did not cause substantial 
disruption to the school. Fourteenth amendment rights 
brought due process protections for students. Fourth 
amendment rights brought protections concerning search 
and seizure. 
These cases are discussed at length in Chapter IV, 
but are discussed here to show how initial landmark 
cases established constitutionally protected rights of 
junveniles i.e. 
a. In re Gault (1967) defined constitutional 
safeguards which must be provided when juvenile 
court proceedings could result in a minor's 
36 
incarceration m an institution. 
35 
Benjamin Sendor, "That heralded high court ruling on 
student searches leaves crucial questions unanswered," 
American School Board Journal (April, 1985), pp. 24-25. 
36In re Gault, 387 US 1, 18 L Ed 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428. 
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b. Tinker v. Pes Moines (1969) upheld the status 
37 
of students as "persons" under the constitution. 
c. Goss v. Lopez (1975) expanded procedural rights 
of students faced with short-term suspensions by 
requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard 
3 8 
prior to suspension. 
d. Baker v. Owen (1975) limited constitutional 
protection if students are afforded certain 
procedural safeguards prior to the administration 
39 of corporal punishment. 
e. Inqraham v. Wright (1977) upheld constitutionality 
40 
of corporal punishment in schools, but 
f. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) held that the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to searches 
conducted by public school officials and is not 
limited to searches carried out by law enforcement 
41 officials. 
37 Tinker V. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 
393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L Ed 2d at 740 (1969). 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 955, Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed 
2d 725 (1975). 
39Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 
U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1975). 
^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651, 662 (1977) . 
^New Jersey v. T.L.D., No 83-712 in 53 LW 4083. 
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3. Certain legal issues were identified in balancing 
necessary school authority with students' constitutional 
rights. 
The most significant legal issues involve sub­
stantive and procedural due process. The substantive 
issues center on the definition of substantial dis­
ruption of or material interference with school 
activities and the definition of the property and the 
liberty interest. Procedural issues result in the 
clarification of procedural due process. 
a. Substantive Issues 
What constituted material and substantial 
interference with the operation of the school 
and the rights of other students became a signi­
ficant issue once students were extended consti­
tutionally protected rights. The state could not 
impair these rights without a compelling reason. 
1) Tinker v. Pes Moines (1969) held that it 
is unconstitutional to suspend students for 
the peaceful wearing of arm bands or for other 
symbolic expression of opinion unless it can be 
shown that material and substantial disruption 
42 
of the school's routine did or would occur. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 
393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
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2) Gravned v. City of Rockford (1972) 
determined that limitations on expressive 
conduct must be narrowly tailored to 
to serve a substantial legitimate govern­
mental interest. Substantial disruption must 
be imminent to validate an official ban on 
picketing, and the judgment as to the like­
lihood of disorder must be made on an indivi­
dualized basis and not by means of broad 
classifications, especially not by means of 
43 
classifications based on subject matter, 
b. Procedural Issues 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states 
from impairing a person's life, liberty, or 
property interest without due process of law. 
Once constitutionally protected rights were 
extended to students at issue was what the 
liberty and property interest were and what form 
the due process would take. 
1) Property and Liberty Interests 
(a) In Goss v. Lopez (1975) the Court 
determined that students have a 
^Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 33 L Ed 
2d 233, 92 S Ct 2295. 
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"property" interest in public education. 
Although there is no constitutional 
provision guaranteeing free public 
education, the fact that the State 
provides its children with such an 
education creates a constitutionally 
protected interest. 
(b) In Goss v. Lopez (1975) the court 
determined that students have a "liberty" 
interest in their reputations. Since a 
suspension could damage that interest, due 
44 
process protections will be provided. 
(c) In Baker v. Owen (1975) the court 
determined that 
(1) although parents have a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in the 
control of the rearing and education 
of their children, this right does not 
preclude the state's use of reasonable 
punishment in order to achieve the 
legitimate goal of order in the 
schools; 
(2) the child's Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest in freedom from 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed 
2d 725 (1975). 
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arbitrary infliction of even minimum 
corporal punishment mandates that 
some procedural safeguards be afford­
ed to the child.^ 
2) Definition of Due Process 
(a) In Goss v. Lopez (1975) the Court 
determined that suspensions ordered and 
statutes permitting students to be sus­
pended without notice and hearing are 
unconstitutional. Students who are 
suspended for up to ten days must be 
accorded the following prior to the 
suspension: oral or written notice of 
charges, an explanation of the evidence if 
the student denies the charges, a hearing 
that includes an opportunity to present 
46 
the student's view of the incident. 
(b) In Wood v. Strickland (1975) the Court 
determined that the administrator must act 
in accord with the settled law and with 
the constitutional rights of those af­
fected by official action in order to be 
^Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 
423 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1975). 
^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 95 S Ct 729, 42 L Ed 
2d 725 (1975). 
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immune from a law suit for damages. If a 
school official acts out of ignorance or 
in disregard to settled law he/she may be 
47 sued. 
(c) Baker v. Owen (1975) the court affirmed 
that a statute allowing reasonable cor­
poral punishment for the purpose of 
maintaining order in the schools is 
constitutional if it is administered in 
accordance with certain procedural protec­
tions viz. 
(1) Except for acts of misconduct that 
are so anti-social or disruptive as 
to shock the conscience, corporal 
punishment may not be used unless the 
student has first been warned that 
the conduct for which he is being 
punished will occasion its use and 
unless other means have first been 
used to modify the student's be­
havior . 
(2) A second teacher or other school 
^Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 
L.Ed. 2d 214 (1974). 
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official must be present at the time 
the punishment is inflicted and must 
be informed, prior to its infliction 
and in the student's presence, of the 
reason for the punishment. This 
affords the student an informal 
opportunity to raise his objection to 
arbitrary punishment. 
(3) The school official who administered 
the punishment must provide, on 
parental request, a written explana­
tion of his/her reasons for punish­
ment and the name of the second 
48 
official who was present. 
4. Significant constitutional issues had to be 
resolved in order to determine the extent of students' 
constitutionally protected rights v. the concept of in 
loco parentis. 
a. The most significant constitutional issue was 
whether or not juveniles would be afforded consti­
tutional rights. Significant issues in the courts 
have been whether it was determined that school 
officials were acting parens patria-in the 
48Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd 423 
U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed. 2d 137 1975). 
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interest of the state, acting in loco parentis-in 
the place of the parent or protecting a constitu­
tional interest. Justice Fortas, in delivering the 
opinion of the Court In re Gault (1967) argued that 
juvenile proceedings were supposedly not adver­
sarial, and that the state was proceeding as parens 
patriae: 
The Latin phrase proved to be a great 
help to those who sought to rationa­
lize the exclusion of juveniles from 
the constitutional scheme; but its 
meaning is murky and its historical 
credentials are of dubious relevance. 
The phrase was taken from chancery 
practice, where, however, it was used to 
describe the power of the state to act in 
loco parentis for the purpose of protect­
ing the property interest and the person 
of the child. 
Justice Fortas stated: 
Juvenile Court history has again demon­
strated that unbridled discretion, 
however benevolently motivated, is fre­
quently a poor5substitute for principle 
and procedure. 
b. Another significant constitutional issue 
was whether or not students would be afforded 
constitutional rights. Justice Fortas 
expressing the view of seven members of the 
Court in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent 




School District (1969) stated: 
In our system, state-operated schools 
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. 
School officials do not possess absolute 
authority over their students. Students 
in school as well as out of school are 
"persons" under our Constitution. They 
are possessed of fundamental rights which 
the state must respect, just as they 
themselves mus£ respect their obligations 
to the State. 
Justice Potter Stewart concurred with the 
Tinker decision but expressed a reservation: 
I cannot share the Court's uncritical 
assumption that, school discipline aside, 
the First Amendment rights of children,^ 
are co-extensive with those of adults. 
E. Summary 
Changes in the society brought about changes in the 
bases of authority of elementary and secondary public 
school administration. The Civil Rights Movement and 
Student Protest Movement heightened the awareness of some 
in the society to individual rights. The media played a 
significant part in the societal change. Protest took 
place not just in major cities and at universities but came 
into the homes of millions of Americans thru media cover­
age. The emphasis on individual rights was pervasive. 
The Civil Rights Movement in the 1950's and 1960's 
with its emphasis on voting rights, access to public 
^Tinker, op. cit 21 L Ed 2d 740. 
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accomodations, and economic opportunities for Blacks 
brought a renewed focus on civil rights into the American 
mainstream. Desegregation of the schools brought increased 
Court involvement in the operation of public schools. 
Tactics employed in this movement were used by many in the 
student protest movement. 
The Student Protest Movement focused on racial in­
justice, war, and the university. Campus activism brought 
a resurrgence of emphasis on first amendment rights. It 
was only a matter of time before this became a central 
issue in elementary and secondary public schools. 
These movements brought about significant changes in 
the society. They set the tone for changes in attitudes in 
the Court concerning the rights of students. Landmark 
cases in the 1960's and 1970's established specific consti­
tutionally protected rights of students. Even as the Court 
began to shift to a more conservative stance, the change in 
the underlying basis of authority had already been estab­
lished. The Court was committed to the constitutional 
rights of students and decided limitations were placed on 
in loco parentis as a basis of authority in public schools. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF SELECTED COURT DECISIONS ESTABLISHING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTED RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 
A. Introduction 
B. Selected Cases Determining First 
Amendment Rights 
C. Selected Cases Determining Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights 




This chapter presents a review of landmark decisions 
and other significant court decisions which relate directly 
to the definition and interpretation of constitutional 
protected rights of students as they related to the first, 
fourth, and fourteenth amendments. The landmark United 
State Supreme Court decisions are reviewed because they 
clarify the changing definition of constitutional rights of 
students. An overview is presented for each category and 
specific facts and judicial decisions are given. Discus­
sion of each case is presented as it pertains to the 
category to which it applies. Categories and cases are 
listed below: 
B. Selected Cases Determining First Amendment Rights 
Overview 
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Freedom of Expression 
Burnside v. Byars (1966) . 
Tinker v. Pes Moines (1969) . 
Pico v. Board of Education, Island Tree 
Union Free School District (1980) . 
Freedom of Assembly 
Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972). 
C. Selected Cases Determining Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights 
Due Process Applications 
In Re Gault (1967) 
Goss v. Lopez (1975) 
Baker v. Owen (1975) 
Inqraham v. Wright (1977) 
D. Selected Cases Determining Fourth Amendment Rights 
Search and Seizure 
Picha v. Wielqos (1976) . 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985). 
B. Selected Cases Determining First Amendment Rights 
Overview 
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally been 
reluctant to interfere in school matters related to the 
rights and responsibilities of students. A major reason for 
this orientation is the strong belief of the judiciary in the 
American tradition of local control over the schools.* 
The flag saluting cases of the early forties were not 
to be followed by another landmark decision in student rights 
Perry A. Zirkel, Ed., A Digest of Supreme Court 
Decisions Affecting Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi 
Delta Kappa, 1978), p. 32. 
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2 for 26 years. The West Virginia case was important 
relative to early judicial recognition of the substantive 
due process rights of students. 
Public educational institutions are not enclaves 
immune from First Amendment rights. These rights must be 
applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment. School authorities are not exempt from 
the operation and limitations of the First Amendment. 
The Courts, must balance First Amendment rights 
against the state's interest in preserving and protecting 
3 
its educational process. 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution 
affords pervasive rights to citizens. The Supreme Court 
has extended these rights to students. Students in school, 
as well as out of school, are persons under the federal 
Constitution and possess fundamental constitutional 
4 
rights. 
Students have the same rights and enjoy the same 
privileges as adults and do not shed them when they enter 
the school grounds. These rights are not necessarily 
coextensive with adults. The exercise of First Amendment 
^Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 568 
(1940). Reversed by West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1934). 
316A C.J.S. 467, p 510. 
416A C.J.S. 469, p. 513 
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rights may be circumscribed by reasonable rules and regula­
tions which are necessary for the orderly administration of 
the school system. Thus, students must exercise their 
First Amendment rights without materially and substantially 
interfering with appropriate discipline in the operation of 
5 
the school and must not collide with the rights of others. 
Freedom of Expression 
This section focuses on judicial interpretations of 
students' rights to freedom of expression. 
Burnside v. Byars 
363F. 2d 744(1966) 
Facts: 
Several students at Booker T. Washington High School 
in Philadelphia, Mississippi wore "freedom buttons" to 
school which had been obtained from the Council of Fede­
rated Organizations. The buttons were circular, approxi­
mately lh inches in diameter with the words "One Man One 
Vote" around the perimeter and "SNCC" inscribed in the 
center. Mr. Montgomery Moore, Principal, announced to the 
entire student body that they were not permitted to wear 
such buttons in the school house or in their various 
classes since the buttons "didn't have any bearing on their 
education, would cause commotion."*' 
516A C.J.S. 469, p. 514 
^Burnside v. Byars, 363F. 2d, pp. 746-747. 
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Despite the announcement on September 21, 1964, three 
or four children appeared at school wearing the button. 
All had an opportunity to remove the buttons and remain at 
school but three children elected to keep them and return 
home. The following day all returned without their 
buttons. On September 24, 1964 a teacher reported that 30 
or 40 children were displaying the buttons and that it was 
causing a commotion. Mr. Moore then assembled the children 
in his office, reminded them of the announcement and gave 
them a choice of removing the buttons or being sent home. 
The great majority elected to return home and Mr. Moore 
suspended them for one week. Mr. Moore delivered a letter 
to each parent concerning the suspension, and all parents 
agreed to cooperate except Mrs. Burnside, Mrs. English and 
Mrs. Morris. 
Whereupon injunctive proceedings were instituted 
against the school officials to enjoin them from enforcing 
the regulation. Appellants contended that the regulation 
forbidding "freedom buttons" on school property was an 
unreasonable rule which abridged their children's First and 
Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech. Appellees con­
tended that the regulation was reasonable in maintaining 
proper discipline in the school and that the District Court 




The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a student 
may express opinions on controversial issues in the class­
room, cafeteria, playing field, or any other place, as long 
as the exercise of such rights does "not materially and 
substantially interfere with the requirements of appro-
7 
priate discipline in the operation of the school." 
Discussion: 
The appellate court invalidated a regulation that 
prohibited students from wearing freedom buttons while 
attending school. The court concluded that the wearing of 
these buttons did not hamper the school in carrying out its 
regular schedule of activities. Nor were the rights of 
other students impaired. Only a mild state of curiosity 
was evident among the students. The court, noting that the 
right to communicate a matter of vital public concern is 
protected by the First Amendment, held that the students 
were merely exercising this right by wearing buttons to 
express an idea. In another case on the same day in the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court denied students 
this form of expression. ' The reason for the apparent 
reversal was that in Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of 
O 
Education the button wearers cfreated disturbances within 
7Ibid., p. 749. 
O 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education 
363F. 2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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the school by harrassing students who did not take part in 
this form of expression. 
Thus, it appears that courts will sanction regulations 
that place constraints on students' freedom of expression 
but only in situations where disruption reasonably can be 
9 predicted as a result of the expression. 
Tinker v. Pes Moines Indep. Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 
21L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) 
Facts: 
As part of a plan formulated by a group of adults and 
students in Des Moines, Iowa, two public high school 
students and one junior high student, wore black armbands 
to their schools to publicize their objections to the 
hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce, 
despite the fact that they were aware that a few days 
previously school authorities had adopted a policy or 
regulation that any student wearing an armband to school 
would be asked to remove it and if he refused would be 
suspended until he returned without the armband. As a 
result these students, John F. Tinker, John's sister Mary 
Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, were all sent home 
and suspended from school until they could come back 
without their armbands. The petitioners, through their 
fathers, filed a complaint in the United State District 
9 
McCarthy and Cambron, pp. 262-263. 
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Court of the Southern District of Iowa, praying for an 
injunction restraining the school authorities from disci­
plining the petitioners, and seeking nominal charges. 
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dismissed 
the complaint, upholding the constitutionality of the 
school authorities' action on the ground that it was 
reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of discipline. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed without an opinion. 
Decision; 
The United State Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
Justice Fortas expressed the view of seven members of the 
court that the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of 
the case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially 
disruptive conduct by those participating in it, and as 
such was akin to "pure speech" and entitled to comprehen­
sive protection under the First Amendment, and that the 
school regulation prohibiting students from wearing arm­
bands violated the students' rights of free speech under 
the First Amendment where there was no evidence that the 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of 
the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of 
the school. 
Discussion; 
Justice Fortas made a clear assertion concerning the 
First Amendment rights of school children; 
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It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedj^ of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate. 
This clearly judicially recognized students' constitu­
tional rights to freedom of speech and expression. This 
was the beginning of a new era in students' rights: 
Students in school as well as out of school are 
'persons' under our Constitution. They are 
possessed of fundamental rights which the state 
must respect, just as they mus1^^themselves respect 
their obligations to the state. 
Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd. and remanded, 
638 F. 2d. 404 (sd Cir. 1980) 
Facts: 
Two school board members from the Island Tree Union 
Free School District attended a meeting of a conservative 
group Parents of New York United (PONYU) concerning ob­
jection able books used in the public schools. The books 
were labeled as anti-semitic, filthy and irrelevant. The 
Island Tree Union Free School board members checked the 
high school card catalog and located several of the objec­
tionable books. 
The school board appointed a committee of profes­
sionals to review the questionable books, but the recommen­
dations of the appointed committee were not followed. Nine 
10Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School District 
393 U. S., at 506, 89S. Ct., at 737. 
11Ibid., p. 511 or p. 740. 
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books were removed from the library and the classrooms. 
The school board then insisted that the nine books not be 
assigned as required or as optional reading, but could be 
discussed in class. 
A class action suit was filed by students, parents, 
and friends of students alleging that students1 First 
Amendment right was violated by the removal of the books. 
Decision 
The federal district court ruled that the school board 
had acted within the scope of power and had not violated 
the constitutional rights of students. On appeal, the 
second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that substan­
tial evidence suggested that the school board was poli­
tically and religiously motivated in removing the books. 
Board policies, insisted Justice Sifton, were "pretexts for 
12 the suppression of free speech." Joseph Bryson points 
out in Censorship Of Public School Library And Instruc­
tional Material: "In reality, the book(s) conflicting 
ideology-shocking the conscience and jarring the emotions-
13 
issues never became part of the discussion." 
*^Pico v. Board of Educ. 638 F. 2d 404 (2d Cir. 1981). 
13 
Joseph E. Bryson and Elizabeth W. Detty, The Legal 
Aspects Of Censorships Of Public School Library And 
Instructional Materials (Charlottesville, Virginia: The 
Michie Co. 1982), pp. 131-132. 
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The district court decision was reversed and the case 
remanded for trial, but the school board appealed the 
Second Circuit Court's decision to the United States 
Supreme Court. On June 25, 1982, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision. 
Discussion: 
Thus, on June 25, 1982, the Supreme Court (in a 
five-four decision) acknowledged that school children not 
only have the right to First Amendment self-expression but 
also the First Amendment right to receive information and 
ideas. The Pico majority (Justice Brennan, Marshall, 
Stevens, Blackmun and White) were especially concerned with 
school board members who predicate policy on personal, 
political and religious ideology. The Pico minority 
(Justices Burger, Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist) acknow­
ledged that school children have the right to First Amend­
ment self-expression but would grant greater responsibility 
14 
to school boards in selecting library materials. 
Freedom of Assembly 
Peaceful demonstrations in public places, subject to 
reasonable regulation, are protected by the First Amend­
ment. In the following case the Supreme Court considered 
the question of how to accomodate First Amendment rights 
with the special characteristics of the school environment. 
14 Ibid., pp. 132-134. 
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Grayned v. City of Rockford 
408 U.S. 104, 33L. Ed. 2d. 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294. 
Facts; 
Richard Grayned was convicted for his part in a demon­
stration in front of West Senior High School in Rockford 
Illinois. Black students had first presented their grie­
vances to school administrators. When the principal took 
no action on complaints, a public demonstration of protest 
was planned. On April 25, 1969, approximately 200 people-
students, family members and friends gathered next to 
school grounds. Appellant Richard Grayned, whose brother 
and twin sisters attended the school, was part of this 
group. The demonstrators marched on a sidewalk about 100 
feet from the school building which was set back from the 
street. Many carried signs summarizing the grievances: 
"Black cheerleaders to cheer too"; "Black history with 
black teachers"; "Equal rights Negro counselors." Others 
made the "power to the people" sign with their upraised and 
clenched fists. Evidence regarding noise was contradic­
tory. 
Grayned was one of 40 police arrested. He was tried, 
convicted of violating the Rockford antipicketing ordinance 
which outlawed demonstrations near schools in session 
except peaceful labor picketing and the Rockford antinoise 
ordinance which prohibited disturbing a school session by 
willfully making a noise or diversion while on adjacent or 
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private grounds. Since Grayned challenged the constitu­
tionality of each ordinance, he appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Illinois. He claimed the ordinances were invalid. 
15 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 
Decision? 
On appeal, the United State Supreme court reversed 
with respect to the antipicketing ordinance, but affirmed 
with respect to the antinoise ordinance. The Court held 
that the antipicketing ordinance violated the equal protec­
tion clause because it made an impermissible distinction 
between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. The 
Court held that the antinoise ordinance was neither uncon­
stitutionally vague nor was it overbroad in restricting 
First Amendment freedoms. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall in an opinion expressing the 
views of seven members of the Court stated: 
Just as Tinker made clear that school property may 
not be declared off limits for expressive activity 
by students, we think it clear that the public 
sidewalk adjacent to school grounds may not be 
declared off limits forg expressive activity by 
members of the public." But in each case, ex­
pressive activity may be prohibited if it 'mater­
ially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.' 
1546 111 2d 492, 263 NE2d 866. 
"^Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S., at 
513, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 741. 
"^Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L Ed. 
2d. 222, p. 233, 92 S. Ct. 2294. 
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Justice Marshall stated: 
Rockford's anti noise ordinance goes no further 
than Tinker says a municipality may go to prevent 
interference with its schools. It is narrowly 
tailored to further Rockford's compelling interest 
in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to the students' learning, and does not unnecessar­
ily interfere with First Amendment rights. 
Discussion; 
Picketing involves expressive conduct within the 
protection of the First Amendment. Limitations on picket­
ing must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial 
legitimate governmental interest to be valid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Substantial disruption must be 
imminent to validate an official ban on picketing. 
On June 26, 1972 the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
right of citizens to peaceful picketing on public grounds 
declaring the antipicketing ordinance in violation of the 
equal protection clause. At the same time the Court 
determined that the antinoise ordinance was constitutional 
since it protected the school from noisy demonstrations 
that disrupt but the antinoise ordinance did not impose a 
. . 19 
restriction on expressive activity. 
The Court was almost unanimous in its decision. Seven 
members (Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, Burger, Powell, 
and Rehnquist) agreed with the total decision. Justice 
18Ibid., p. 234. 
19Ibid, pp. 234-235. 
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Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion as to the peaceful 
picketing and concurred in the result as to the antinoise" 
ordinance. Justice William 0. Douglas joined in the 
opinion as to the picketing but dissented as to the an-
tinoise on the ground that the demonstrator could not 
constitutionally be convicted, because he was not noisy, 
boisterous or rowdy at the demonstration. 
C. Selected Cases Determining Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights 
Due Process Applications 
Traditionally Due Process did not apply to public 
schools as it did to other agencies. The United States 
Supreme Court had been reluctant to interfere in school 
matters. That changed in the late sixties. The Gault 
decision in 1967, through not a school decision, opened the 
door to renewed interest by the Court in the rights and 
responsibilities of students. The Court proceeded to hand 
down nine decisions in this area in the next ten years. 
Due process is a major limitation on the exercise of 
administrative authority to insure constitutional rights to 
all citizens. Two aspects of due process are: procedural 
concerns and substantive concerns. 
The cases discussed below are significant because they 
represent a general expansion by the Court of procedural 
safeguards to various private liberty and property in­
terests. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
20 
law...." Cases discussed here make that "property" right 
apply to public education. The Fourteenth Amendment also 
provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its 
21 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that protection of the law be 
22 
extended equally to all persons. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
Facts i 
A fifteen year old boy, Gerald Francis Gault, was 
taken into custody as a result of a complaint that he had 
made an obscene phone call. After several hearings at 
which the boy was not represented by legal counsel and was 
not allowed to confront the complaining witness, the 
juvenile court sentenced him to a maximum of six years in a 
state school for juvenile delinquents. An adult found 
guilty of the same act would have had a maximum penalty of 
two months imprisonment and a $50 fine. There was no 
20 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 
1. 
22 
Leroy J. Peterson, Richard A. Rossmiller, and Marlin 
M. Volz, The Law And Public School Operation, 2d ed. (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1978), pp. 6-7. 
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provision for appeal of juvenile court decisions. The 
boy's parents challenged the validity of a state juvenile 
court statute which allows a child to be incarcerated yet 
denies him basic constitutional rights. The Superior court 
dismissed the petition and theSupreme Court of Arizona 




On May 15, 1967, Justice Abe Fortas delivered the 
opinion expressing the views of five members of the Court 
(Portas, Douglas, Warren, Brennan, Marshall). Justice Hugo 
Black concurred but expressed the view that the procedure 
followed was invalid becuase it violated the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments and not because it was "unfair." Justice 
Byron R. White concurred and joined the opinion except that 
he would not reach issues as to self-incrimination, confron­
tation and cross-examination. Justice John M. Harlan 
concurred in part and dissented in part stating that 
Juvenile Court proceedings must have the essential elements 
of fundamental fairness-notice, counsel, and a record-but 
that imposition of requirements regarding self-incrimina­
tion, confrontation, and cross-examination should be 
deferred. Justice Potter Stewart dissented on the ground 
23In re Gault, 387 US 1, 18 L Ed 2d 527, 87 S. Ct 
1428. 
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that while a state must accord every person due process of 
law, the constitutional restrictions applicable to adver­
sary criminal trials should not be applied to juvenile 
proceedings. 
The court ruled that when juvenile court proceedings 
could result in the incarceration of a minor, certain 
constitutional safeguards must be provided: 
1. timely and adequate written notice of charges must 
be given to the minor and his/her parents or 
guardian 
2. parents or guardians must be informed of their 
right to legal counsel and if they are unable to 
afford a lawyer, counsel will be appointed by the 
court to represent them 
3. the constitutional privilege against self 
incrimination applies to these proceedings 
4. absent a valid confession, a child has a right to 
cross examine hostile-witnesses and to present 
his/her own witnesses 
Discussion: 
This landmark case, marked the beginning of constitu­
tional protected rights for juveniles. Though it was not a 
school case, per se, by extending constitutional protected 
rights to juveniles, it led the way for tremendous change 
in public school administration. 
For the first time, amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States applied to those under, as well as over, 
the age of eighteen. 
2^Zirkel, p. 37. 
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This case related directly to the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments. Children faced with a loss of liberty must be 
afforded procedural safeguards required by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects citizens 
and, as a result of this case, juveniles against state 
action impairing life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law. The Fifth Amendment creates a right 
against self incrimination in criminal issues and this was 
extended to juvenile proceedings. 
Goss v. Lopez, 
419 US 565, 42L Ed 2d 725, 95SC+729 
(1975) 
Facts: 
An Ohio statute empowered the principal of an Ohio 
public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 
ten days or to expel him; in either case the principal must 
notify the parents within twenty four hours and state the 
reasons for the action. Suspensions arose out of a period 
of widespread student unrest in the Columbus Public School 
\ 
System during February and March, 1971. In class action 
brought by Ohio public school students in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the named 
plaintiffs alleged that they had been suspended from public 
high school in Columbus, Ohio, for up to ten days without a 
hearing. The action was brought against the Columbus Board 
of Education and various administrators of the school 
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system for deprivation of constitutional rights. The 
complaint sought a declaration that the Statute was uncon­
stitutional in that it permitted public school administra­
tors to deprive plaintiffs of their right to an education 
without a hearing of any kind, in violation of the proce­
dural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
also sought to enjoin public school officials from issuing 
future suspensions pursuant to the statute and to require 
them to remove references to past suspensions from the 
records of the students in question. A three-judge Dis­
trict Court granted the relief sought by the plaintiffs. 
Decision; 
On direct appeal to the United State Supreme Court, 
the Court affirmed. Justice Byron R. White expressed the 
view of five members of the court (White, Douglas, Brennan, 
Stewart, and Marshall) holding that the Ohio statute, 
insofar as it permitted up to ten days suspension without 
notice or hearing, either before or after the suspension, 
violated the due process clause and that each suspension 
was therefore invalid. Justices Powell, Burger, Blackmun, 
and Rehnquist dissented expressing the view that the 
majority decision opened avenues for judicial intervention 
in the operation of the public schools that may affect 
adversely the quality of education and that a student's 
interest in education is not infringed by a suspension 
within the limited period prescribed by Ohio law. 
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Two significant aspects of this decision involved 
explanation of students' property and liberty interest. 
Although there is no constitutional provision guaranteeing 
free public education, the fact that the state has provided 
its children with such an education creates a constitution­
ally protected interest. Justice White wrote that the 
authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce 
standards of conduct in its schools, although it is broad, 
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safe­
guards . 
Among other things, the State is constrained to 
recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a 
public education as a property interest which is 
protected by the Due Process clause and which may 
not be taken away for misconduct without adherence 
to "the^c minimum procedures required by that 
Clause. 
The Due Process clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty: 
If sustained and recorded, those charges could 
seriously damage the students' standing with their 
fellow pupils and their teachers as well as inter­
fere with later^.opportunities for higher education 
and employment. 
The Court, having determined that due process applies, 
went on to determine what process is due. Rudimentary 
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of miscon­
duct and arbitrary exclusion from school were defined: 
^Goss v. Lopez, 42 L Ed 2d 734-735. 
26Ibid., p. 735. 
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Students facing temporary suspension have interests 
qualifying for protection of the Due Process 
Clause, and due process requires, in connection 
with a suspension of ten days or less, that the 
student be given oral or written notice of the 
charges against him and, if he denies them, an 
explanation of the evidence the authorities have 
and ai^ opportunity to present his side of the 
story. 
There need be no delay between the notice and the subse­
quent hearing. Constitutional requirements may be met by 
an informal discussion which includes the necessary ele­
ments. Unless the student's continued presence in the 
school poses a threat to persons, property, or the academic 
program, the required procedures shall precede suspension. 
If it becomes necessary to remove a student immediately, 
the notice and hearing must follow within a reasonable 
time. Long suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of 




This decision had great impact on the role of the 
disciplinarian in a public school. No longer could he/she 
assume to be acting in loco parentis. This decision more 
clearly defined the adversarial role of the school adminis­
trator protecting the interests of the school v.s. the 
student having his/her own constitutionally protected 
27Ibid., p. 739. 
28Ibid., pp. 739-740. 
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interests. In effect, this finished in loco parentis as a 
legal defense for school disciplinarians. In loco parentis 
continued to have meaning in some school settings, especial­
ly where a standard of safety was concerned, but became 
archaic in matters of school discipline as a result of this 
decision. 
Baker v. Owen, 
395 F. Supp. 294 (1975) 
Facts: 
A sixth grade student, Russell Carl Baker, and his 
mother, Virginia Baker, brought and action against a school 
principal and others, claiming that their constitutional 
rights were violated when the student was given corporal 
punishment by his teacher over his mother's objections and 
without procedural due process. The student, Russell Carl 
Baker, was paddled on December 6, 1973 for allegedly 
violating his teacher's announced rule against throwing 
kickballs except during designated play periods. Mrs. 
Baker had previously requested of the principal and certain 
teachers that her son not be corporally punished, because 
she opposed it on principle. Nevertheless, shortly after 
his alleged misconduct her son received two licks in the 
presence of another teacher and in the view of other 
students. 
Mrs. Baker alleged that the administration of corporal 
punishment after her objections violated her parental right 
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to determine disciplinary methods for her child. Russell 
Carl charged that the circumstances in which the punishment 
was administered violated his right to procedural due 
process and that the punishment in this instance was cruel 
and unusual. They challenged the constitutionality of 
North Carolina General Statues§ 115-146 claiming it was 
unconstitutional insofar as it allowed corporal punishment 
over parental objection and absent adequate procedural 
29 safeguards. 
A Three-Judge District Court, Craven, Circuit Judge, 
held: 
We hold that fourteenth amendment liberty 
embraces the right of parents generally to control 
means of discipline of their children, but that the 
state has a countervailing interest in the main­
tenance of order in the schools, in this case 
sufficient to sustain the right of teachers and 
school officials to administer reasonable corporal 
punishment for disciplinary purposes. We also hold 
that teachers and school officials must accord to 
students minimal procedural due process in the 
course of inflicting such punishment. We further 
hold that the spanking of Russell Carl in this3case 
did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 
The United States District Court acknowledged the 
constitutional stature of parental rights: 
We agree with Mrs. Baker that the fourteenth 
amendment concept of liberty embraces the right of 
a parent to determine and choose between means of 
discipline of children, but few constitutional 
rights are absolute. Our inquiry does not end with 
Baker v. Owen 395 F. Supp. 296 (1975) . 
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the conclusion that Mrs. Baker has such a right but 
we must go on to consider the nature and extent of 
the state's interest in school discipline. Some­
times the rights of citizens that find protection 
within the Constitution are overborne by a counter­
vailing and greater state interest. We think that 
is the situation here-whether the test to be 
applied is that of a compelling state interest or 
simply of a rational and legitimate interest in 
maintaining order and discipline in the public 
schools. We embark upon the traditional analysis, 
aware that to apply the compelling interest test 
merely encapsulates the result and that "no state 
law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmount­
able standard." 
The court rejected Mrs. Baker's suggestion that this 
right is fundamental, and that the state can punish her 
child corporally only if it shows a compelling interest: 
We do not read Meyer and Pierce to enshrine 
parental rights so high in the hierarchy of consti­
tutional values. In each case the parental right 
prevailed not because the Court termed it funda­
mental and the state's interest uncompelling, but 
because the Court considered the state's action to 
be arbitrary, without reasonable relation to an end 
legitimately within its power. 
In regard to Mrs. Baker's claim that corporal punish­
ment is unconstitutional, the Court ruled: 
So long as the force used is reasonable-and 
that is all that the statute here allows-school 
officials are free to employ corporal punishment 
for disciplinary purposes until in the exercise of 
their own professional judgment, or in response to 
concerted pressure from opposing parent^- they 
decide that its harm outweighs its utility. 
31Ibid., p. 299. 
32 
Ibid. 
33Ibid., p. 301 
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The Court also determined that the punishment 
administered was not cruel and unusual. 
The Court assumed the task of fashioning due process 
procedures in order to accomodate "the child's interest and 
the state's unquestioned interest in effective discipline": 
First, except for those acts of misconduct 
which are so anti-social or disruptive in nature as 
to shock the conscience, corporal punishment may 
never be used unless the student was informed 
before-hand that specific misbehavior could 
occasion its use, and, subject to this exception, 
it should never be employed as a first line of 
punishment for misbehavior. The requirements of an 
announced possibility of corporal punishment and an 
attempt to modify behavior by some other means-
keeping after school, assigning extra work, or some 
other punishment-will insure that the child 
has clear notice that certain behavior subjects him 
to physical punishment. Second, a teacher or 
principal must punish corporally in the presence of 
a second school official (teacher or principal), 
who must be informed beforehand and in the 
student's presence of the reason for the 
punishment. The student need not be afforded a 
formal opportunity to present his side to the 
second official; the requirement is intended only 
to allow a student to protest, spontaneously, an 
egregiously arbitrary or contrived application of 
punishment. And finally, an official who has 
administered such punishment must provide the 
child's parent, upon request, a written explanation 
of his reasons and the name of the second official 
who was present. 
Ingraham v. Wright 
430 U.S. 651, 51 L.Ed 2d 711, 97 S.Ct. 1401 
Facts; 
Parents of two students in a Dade County, Florida 
junior high school instituted an action against certain 
34Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
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school officials alleging a violation of their Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights based on disciplinary paddling 
incidents. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive 
and declaratory relief, and their evidence indicated that 
pursuant to Florida law, they were subject to disciplinary 
paddling without prior notice and a hearing, and that the 
paddlings were so severe as to keep one of them out of 
school for eleven days as to deprive the other of the full 
use of his arm for a week. The District Court dismissed 
the complaint on the grounds that there was no 
constitutional basis for relief. A panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit originally 
voted to reverse (498 F 2d 248) , but upon rehearing, the 
Court of Appeals vacated its prior judgement and affirmed 
the District Court's judgement (525 F2d 909). On 
certiorari, the United State Supreme Court affirmed. 
Decision: 
Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 
Court. The Court held that the disciplinary paddling of 
public school students did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment since 1) 
the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect those con­
victed of crime and did not apply to disciplinary punish­
ment of public school children and since 2) extension of 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause to ban the paddling 
of school children was not justified because public schools 
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were open to public scrutiny and were supervised by the 
community, and because teachers and administrators were 
subject to the legal restraints of the common law whereby 
punishment exceeding that which was reasonably necessary 
could result in both civil and criminal liability under 
state law. The Court also held that though corporal 
punishment in public schools implicated a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless the due process 
clause did not require prior notice and a hearing before 
the disciplinary paddling of a student since 1) the tradi­
tional common law remedies under state law were fully 
adequate to afford due process, and 2) even if the need for 
advance procedural safeguards were clear, imposing a 
constitutional requirement of prior notice and a hearing 
would significantly burden the use of corporal punishment 
as a discipline measure and would entail an intrusion into 
an area of primary educational responsibility, whereas the 
risk of error that might result in violation of substantive 
was regarded as minimal in view of the law incidence of 
abuse of corporal punishment by school authorities, the 
openness of the public schools and the common law safe­
guards . 
Discussion: 
It is of significance to this study that Justice 
Powell in delivering the opinion of the Court stated: 
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Although the early cases viewed the authority of 
the teacher as deriving from the parents, the 
concept of parental delegation has been replaced 
by the view-more consonant with compulsory 
education laws-that the State itself may impose 
such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 
"for the proper education of the child and for the 
maintenance of group discipline.11 1 F., [Harper & 
James, Law of Torts f 3.20, p. 292 (1956) 
This is a more conservative opinion than many of the cases 
presented earlier in this study and yet it demonstrates 
moving away from the in loco parentis doctrine as a basis 
of authority. 
D. Selected Cases Determining Fourth Amendment Rights 
Search and Seizure 
This section concerns the Fourth Amendment's prohibi­
tion of unreasonable search and seizure as it relates to 
students attending public elementary and secondary schools. 
The cases discussed in this section are significant because 
they clarify student rights which are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment; Picha v. Wielgos (1976) is significant 
because it clarifies the constitutional right not to be 
searched by school officials who are in contact with the 
police unless the search is justified in terms of the state 
interest of maintaining order, discipline, safety, supervi­
sion, and education of students within the school. The 
court also clarified that student has a constitutional 
right not to have the police cause a search in the absence 
^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 662. 
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of probable cause. New Jersey v. T.L.O., (1985) is of 
significance because it clarifies that searches of students 
conducted by public school officials be reasonable but that 
they need not be supported by probable cause; it is suffi­
cient to suspect that the search will turn up evidence of 
violation of law or rules of school as long as the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in light of age and 
sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 
Picha v. Wielqos, 410 F Supp. 1214 (1976) 
Facts; 
In November, 1973, the defendent school principal 
Raymond Wielgos, received a phone call which led him to 
suspect that the plaintiff and two other girls in the 
school possessed illegal drugs. The principal, advised by 
the superintendent to call the police, did so. When the 
police arrived, each of the girls was separately searched 
by the school nurse and the school psychologist in order to 
establish whether any of the three students possess drugs. 
No drugs were found in the searches. A conflict exists in 
the testimony as to the plaintiff's state of undress at 
each particular point of the search and as to the duration 
of the search. The plaintiff, Renee Picha, brought this 42 
U.S.C.§ 1983 suit against the three school officials and 
the two policemen on the theory that in the course of the 
incident her civil rights were violated. 
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Illinois and many other states have statutes which 
confer upon school officials the status of in loco 
parentis regarding their students. 122 111. Rev. 
Stats. §§ 24-24, 34-84a. Illinois has held that 
this status creates certain advantages for school 
officials regarding the standard of common law 
tort intent which must be applied in litigation 
brought against them by students. At least in 
situations which a school official's role of 
keeping discipline is at issue, he cannot be liable 
in tort for mere negligence, but must actgin wanton 
disregard of the safety of his students. 
Judge Flaum stated: 
The only area of ambiguity is exactly what sort of 
behavior by the teacher is to be deemed related to 
"discipline" so as to pick up the extra in loco 
parentis latitude in tort usually afforded only to 
parents. The Illinois Supreme Court has suggested 
that a school official's role in appraising danger 
to the student body where information indicated 
that one of the students had a gun comes under the 
statutory in loco parentis banner. In Re Boykin, 
39 111. 2d 617, 237 N.E. 2d 460, 462 (1968). It 
thus appears to be the state law in Illinois that a 
principal has the same latitude, in tort, to search 
a student for something believed to be dangerous to 
the student or the s^udy body, as would the 
student's actual parent. 
The question raised was whether the Illinois doctrine could 
provide a limitation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 Tort liability 
analogous to what it has done with the common law tort 
liability of teachers as expressed by the statute. The 
issue ultimately is one of the supremacy clause and of the 
obligation of the states to refrain from enacting laws 
which smother constitutional rights. The court clarified: 
"^Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976). 
37Ibid. 
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The activities of a principal cum parent must be 
considered as the activities of a state official, 
giving rise to the constraints which flow from the 
Bill of Rights. A natural parent could oblige his 
child to salute the flag in the morning at 8:00 
a.m., on penalty of loss of breakfast and dinner, 
without being subject to a civil rights suit. A 
schoolteacher, however, could not enforce the same 
commandment without violating the student's First 
Amendment rights. West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette-„319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 
87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) . 
In addressing the loco parentis question, the Court stated: 
Most federal cases have not addressed the loco 
parentis question in determining whether inter­
ferences with constitutional rights can take place 
in school settings. One that did indicated that 
regulations for students' length of hair did not 
relate automatically to the disciplinary function 
accorded to the in loco parentis authority of the 
relevant state statute: 
It is clear that the in loco 
parentis section of the Pennsylvania 
School Code (24 P.S.§ 13-1317) was 
never intended to invest the schools 
with all the authority of parents 
over their minor children, but only 
such control as is necessary to 
prevent infractions of discipline 
and interference with the educa­
tional process. 
Cases that have not explicitly considered the in 
loco parentis status that may be supplied by 
statute have made exactly the same analysis, 
allowing school officials a latitude as against the 
civil rights of students which takes into account 
the disciplinary, and educational concerns that 
inhere in a school setting. For that reason, these 
cases may be deemed to have already deferred as 
38 Ibid. 
Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1080, W.D. Pa. 
1971. 
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much to school authority as they would in the event 
of law comparable to that in Illinois or Pennsyl­
vania. Following that perspective, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 may be deemed in conflict with any broader 
construction of in loco parentis authority, a 
conflict which state law must lose by^virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
The Court continued to clarify the issues of constitutionally 
protected activity by discussing Tinker v. Pes Moines (1969) 
and concluding that any activity which is constitutionally 
protected must meet some comparable standard before it can be 
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inhibited by school officials. 
In discussing Goss v. Lopez (1975) the Court noted the 
similar treatment of the due process standard. Justice Byron 
R. White expressed the view of the majority (White, Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall): 
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe 
and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, 
although concededly very broad, must be exercised 
consistently with other constitutional safe­
guards . 
Thus the Court stated: "...it is evident that the in 
loco parentis authority of a school official cannot tran-
43 
scend constitutional rights." The Court pointed out that 
common law authority does have an impact on the application 




Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at p. 574, 95 S.Ct. at p. 
736, 42 L.2d. 2d at p. 734. 
43 Picha v. Wielgos. 
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At the time of the search, students in public schools 
were not relieved of the protection of the fourth amendment 
except to the extent that a compelling state interest in 
the maintenance of school activities, particularly disci­
pline, required. Where the interest in making the search 
competed with the privacy interest of the individual, the 
scope of the. search had to be appropriately limited in 
order to be constitutionally permissible. 
Discussion; 
When Renee Picha was searched, she had a constitu­
tional right not to be searched by school officials who 
were in' contact with the police unless the extent of the 
intrusion occasioned by the search was justified in terms 
of the State interest of maintaining the order, discipline, 
safety, supervision, and education of students within the 
school. The Court held that she had a constitutional right 
not to have the police cause a search in the absence of 
probable cause that she possessed an illegal material at 
the time of the search. 
Public officials have no immunity from civil rights 
liability when they disregard settled constitutional rights. 
This case is significant because it clarifies specifically 
the hierarchy of bases of authority for public school adminis­
trators. While it recognizes Statutory Codification of in 
loco parentis, it demonstrates clearly that constitutionally 
protected rights of students supercede that authority. 
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New Jersey v. T.L.O 
105 Ct. 733 (1985) 
Facts; 
A teacher at a New Jersey high school upon discovering 
the 14 years old freshman respondent and her companion 
smoking cigarettes in a school laboratory in violation of a 
school rule, took them to the Principal's office, where 
they met with the Assistant Vice Principal. When respon­
dent denied that she had been smoking and claimed that she 
did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal demanded 
to see her purse. Upon opening the purse, he found a pack 
of cigarettes and also noticed a package of cigarette 
rolling papers commonly associated with the use of mari­
juana. He then searched the purse thoroughly and found 
some marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial 
amount of money, an index card containing a list of stu­
dents who owed respondent money, and two letters that 
implicated her in marijuana dealing. The State brought 
delinquency charges against respondent in the Juvenile 
Court, which, after denying respondent's motion to suppress 
the evidence found in her purse, held that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to searches by school officials but that 
the search in question was a reasonable one, and adjudged 
respondent to be a delinquent. The appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation. 
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It vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded on 
other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and 
ordered the suppression of the evidence found in respon­
dent's purse, holding that the search of the purse was 
unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed (94 N.J. 331, 463 
A. 2d 934, reversed). Argued March 28, 2984-Reargued 
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October 2, 1984-Decided January 15, 1985. 
Decision: 
Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 
Court (White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and 0'Conner). 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgement. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice 
John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part 
in which Justice Marshall joined and in part. 
The Court determined that the Fourth Amendment re­
quires that searches of students conducted by public school 
officials be reasonable but not that such searches be 
supported by warrant or probable cause. The search of 
student by a school official is reasonable under Fourth 
Amendment if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that search will turn up evidence of student's violation of 
either law or rules of school, and if measures adopted are 
reasonable related to objectives of search and not 
a a  
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
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excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of student 
and nature of infraction. The teacher's report that 
student had been observed smoking in laboratory in vio­
lation of school rules provided reasonable suspicion justi­
fying school official's decision to open student's purse to 
look for cigarettes. The officials' observation of ciga­
rette rolling papers in purse gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion that student was carrying marijuana and justified 
45 
further search of purse for contraband. 
Discussion; 
The significance of this case is that the Supreme 
Court recognized that public school students are entitled 
to all the protections of the constitution but that these 
rights must be modified because of the school' s need to 
maintain an orderly and safe educational environment. The 
Court made it very clear that in loco parentis doctrine 
does not remove authorities from Fourth Amendment coverage. 
The Court decided that school officials are agents of the 
state when they engage in searches of students and their 
possessions. 
The Court also eased the restrictions to which 
searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The 
Court held that school authorities need not obtain warrants 




not be required. The validity of the search will depend on 
reasonableness. The Court established a standard for 
reasonableness. 
E. Summary 
These landmark decisions defined and interpreted 
constitutional protected rights of students. Decisions to 
date have extended rights for students based on interpreta­
tions of the first, fourteenth and fourth amendments. 
First amendment freedom of speech cases determined that 
students could express opinions on controversial issues at 
school as long as they did not "materially and substan­
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
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discipline in the operation of the school." The Supreme 
Court extended these rights to students. Tinker set the 
precedent for comprehensive protection under the First 
47 
Amendment allowing the wearing of armbands. 
The definition of due process procedures to public 
education resulted from a series of Supreme Court decisions 
extending the Constitutional protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to students. Cases interpreting fourth amendment 
rights of students clarified protected rights. Prior to 
^^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d, 749. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School District, 
393 U.S., at 506, 89 s. Ct., at 737. 
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the Supreme Court decisions interpreting these rights, 
students had no constitutional protection from unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
This chapter demonstrates the changing nature of the 
law and the significance of the living constitution. 
Supreme Court interpretations of Constitutional law deter­
mine the definition and consequent extension of rights. 
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CHAPTER V 





E. Concluding Statement 
A. Introduction 
Throughout the history of American public elementary 
and secondary education, the concept of in loco parentis 
has been a source of authority for public school teachers 
and administrators in matters of governance and discipline. 
This source of authority empowered the teachers and adminis­
trators to act in the interest of the parents. The signi­
ficance of providing constitutional rights to students was 
that the authority which administrators had formerly held 
was limited by the constitution. Students had their own 
rights and administrators had a responsibility not to 
infringe upon those rights. Explicit limitations on the 
authority of administrators provided protections for 
students. Extension of rights to students also emphasized 
the fragile nature of assuming that administrators were 
representing parents in matters of discipline. Disputes 
between parents, students and administrators became more 
common. 
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The Tinker (1969) case was the landmark case which 
first established constitutionally protected rights of 
public school students. Constitutionally protected rights 
of students brought about change so great that it shook the 
foundations of the concept of in loco parentis. 
In the process this change brought a radical change in 
the administration of the public schools. 
B. Summary 
As a guide to the educational and legal research, five 
questions were formulated and listed in Chapter I of this 
study. Most of the answers are contained in Chapters III 
and IV. 
1. The first question in Chapter I was: Did the 
establishment of constitutionally protected rights 
for students by the judiciary diminish the autho­
rity of in loco parentis doctrine in the adminis­
tration of public elementary and secondary schools? 
Constitutionally protected rights of students 
diminished the authority of in loco parentis 
doctrine in public elementary and secondary school 
administration. 
a. First Amendment right of freedom of speech 
gave students the right to protest whereas in 
loco parentis administrative doctrine did not 
necessarily allow any dissent. 
b. The Fourteenth Amendment application of rights 
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to students required that a student not be deprived 
of the property interest in an education without 
due process of law. In loco parentis public school 
administration had allowed administrators great 
liberty in representing the parent. If there were 
some dispute with a parent concerning the disciplin­
ing of a child, it was possible not to represent 
that particular parent but some adult standard more 
in keeping with the mores of a particular commun­
ity. Constitutionally protected due process 
provided specific protections for the rights of 
students. 
c. Finally, application of the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure 
of students attending public elementary and 
secondary schools limited the power of public 
school administrators. No longer could un­
reasonable searches or seizures take place in 
the name of representing the parent. 
The second question posed was: What are the 
major judicial decisions which established 
constitutionally protected rights of students? 
The major decisions were discussed at length 
in Chapter IV. These decisions established and 
defined constitutionally protected rights of 
students. First amendment protected students' 
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right of freedom of speech. Fourteenth amendment 
provided due process protections for students in 
order to protect their property interest in an 
education. The fourth amendment provided protec­
tion against unreasonable search and seizure. Of 
greatest significance were the initial cases 
establishing constitutionally protected rights of 
juveniles i.e. In re Gault and of students i.e. 
Tinker v. Pes Moines. 
The third question proposed was: What are the 
significant legal issues in balancing necessary 
school authority in carrying out the state's 
compelling interest in education with students' 
constitutional rights? 
Significant legal issues involved substantive 
and procedural due process. The substantive issues 
centered on the definition of substantial disrup­
tion of or material interference with school 
activities and the definition of property and the 
liberty interest. Procedural issues resulted in 
the clarification of procedural due process, 
a. Substantive Issues 
One significant issue was the definition 
of what constituted material and substantial 
interference with the operation of the school. 
The definition of the rights of students became 
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a significant issue once students were extended 
constitutionally protected rights. 
b. Procedural Issues 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states 
from impairing a person's life, liberty, or 
property interest without due process of law. 
Once constitutionally protected rights were 
extended to students their liberty interest and 
property right emerged as the issue. The 
definition of due process procedures became an 
important issue which was frequently litigated. 
4. The fourth question listed in Chapter I was: What 
are the significant constitutional issues concern­
ing the students' constitutionally protected rights 
versus the concept of in loco parentis? 
a. The most significant constitutional issue was 
whether or not juveniles should be afforded 
constitutional rights. 
b. Another significant constitutional issue was 
whether or not students should be afforded 
constitutional rights. 
5. The final question in Chapter I is: What are the 
significant legal issues concerning public school 
administrators and teachers acting in loco 
parentis, representing the interests of the state, 
and protecting the civil rights of the individual? 
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a. Conflicting roles emerged when public school 
administrators and teachers acted in the 
interest of the parent, the state, and the 
constitution. When these conflicts were not 
resolved to the satisfaction of the public by 
the public schools, they would be resolved by 
the courts. 
b. The very basis of authority of in loco parentis 
was questioned since the court has recognized 
that parental delegation of authority to the 
schools was not entirely consonant with 
compulsory education laws. 
C. Conclusions 
Based on an analysis of judicial decisions, the 
following general conclusions can be made concerning the 
impact of constitutional rights of students on in loco 
parentis in the administration of elementary and secondary 
public education. 
1. The establishment of constitutionally protected 
rights of students has diminished in loco parentis 
authority in public elementary and secondary school 
administration. 
2. The in loco parentis role of the educator changed 
when an adversarial role was established by extend­
ing rights to students which heretofore were not 
rights. Administrators could no longer assume they 
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were representing the parents in matters of 
discipline. Sometimes parents did, in fact, 
disagree with administrators. 
3. Public school administration moved from a somewhat 
stable philosophy supported by customs and 
practices of acting in loco parentis to an ever 
changing concept of public school administration 
which continues to be defined and redefined by the 
courts. 
4. Landmark cases have defined the extension of 
constitutionally protected rights of students. 
5. Significant landmark decisions have influenced 
elementary and secondary public school administra­
tion in student governance and discipline by 
dictating due process procedures. 
6. Courts will intervene in matters of public school 
administration if an individual's constitutionally 
protected right has allegedly been denied. 
D. Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to clarify and distin­
guish the bases of authority for student governance and 
discipline in public school elementary and secondary 
administration by demonstrating the changes brought about 
by the establishment of constitutionally protected rights 
of students. In the course of the study it has become 
obvious that the role of the administrator in elementary 
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and secondary public education is a complex one. The 
administrator represents the parent, the state and the 
Constitution of the United States. The study has demon­
strated that the increased involvement of the courts in the 
administration of elementary and secondary public schools 
enhanced the complexity of the role of the administrator. 
1. Recommendations for Educators 
a. Educators should be informed and up to date 
with respect to constitutional issues and 
legal developments affecting schools. 
Ignorance of the law is no longer an accep­
table excuse for arbitrary or capricious 
policies. Educators must make sure they are 
aware of students rights which are protected 
by the Constitution so that they do not 
violate these constitutionally protected 
rights. Every educator, whether adminis­
trator or teacher, needs to be informed about 
constitutionally protected rights of stu­
dents . 
b. Teacher training institutions and graduate 
schools of educational administration should 
include the study of the influence of Law in 
Education in the curriculum for teachers and 
administrators. Certainly, in addition to 
being well informed about the constitutional 
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rights of students, it is essential that 
educators understand the alterable nature of the 
Law so that they know the significance of the 
living Constitution and keep themselves well 
informed on current interpretations of the Law. 
Recommendations for Further Studies 
Constitutional rights have been extended to 
students. Very little has been done to investi­
gate the impact of these rights on schools. This 
writer recommends areas for further studies: 
a. Investigate the extent to which constitu­
tionally protected rights operate in certain 
schools—a comparative study among schools. 
b. Assess the knowledge of school administrators 
on constitutionally protected rights of stu­
dents. Compare regions, states, systems or 
graduates from specific institutions. 
c. Assess the curriculum content of various 
teacher training programs or educational 
administration programs to determine adequacy 
of instruction on the impact of Law in 
Education. 
d. Assess students in teacher education and 
administrative educational programs to deter­
mine levels of understanding of constitution­
ally protected rights. 
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E. Concluding Statement 
This study discussed the changing bases of authority 
in the administration of elementary and secondary public 
education. The study emphasized the significance of the 
Courts in bringing about a change from in loco parentis as 
a basis of authority to constitutionally protected rights 
of students. 
The public school administrator should know the origin 
of authority for administrative actions. This will enable 
administrators to act with authority. Understanding the 
constraints on in loco parentis and state authority by 
constitutionally protected rights of students is essential. 
Essentially this means that administrators are no 
longer free to act on behalf of the parent if the action 
conflicts with constitutionally protected rights. The 
constitutionally protected rights of students set the 
limits to the authority of public school administrators. 
The administrator may assume a variety of roles in 
elementary and secondary public school administration. The 
complex nature of education leadership demands that public 
school administrators be well informed. Administrators 
must also be well informed if they hope to reduce the 
probability of litigation involving the schools. 
By providing constitutionally protected rights to 
students, the courts have changed public school adminis­
tration. The impact of law in education is extensive. 
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If administrators are concerned with freedom and 
democracy, they must concern themselves with providing an 
atmosphere in the schools whereby students can consider 
conflicting ideologies openly and can learn to express 
themselves freely. 
The function of the school in the society is of great 
importance. Schools are demeaning to the extent that they 
remain instruments of social control. The extension of 
individual rights to students is congruent with a democratic 
society. 
Administrators have an obligation to protect the 
constitutional rights of students. Administrators who are 
concerned with promoting a free and democratic society will 
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